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ABSTRACT

The aim of this project is to observe the evolution of the Israel Lobby. The project
looks at specific conflicts in history beginning with the Iraq War of 2003 in order to
present that by this point in history the Israel lobby had already gained ground in
American politics. The project then goes back in history to directly contrast this
moment of strength by observing the American Jewish community during the
Holocaust, the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the SixDay war in 1967, and finally the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The project does not look
at the specific causes of the conflicts, but it looks at the role played by the Israel lobby
during these events. Because this thesis is very historical, it includes several primary
sources as well as interviews in order to support its argument. This thesis is
significant because it explores an under discussed subject; the Israel Lobby is
constantly observed as the entity that exists today, but scholars overlook its history
and the way in which it was able to become this powerful entity. It is necessary to
look at the lobby’s history because it enables other lobbies to learn from its
experience; in the case of this project, the lobby I am most concerned with is the Arab
lobby. Therefore, the Arab lobby can learn from the steps that the Israel lobby has
been through in order to build a coalition that has a weighted voice in the American
political scene.
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Topic: Understanding the Evolution of the Israel
Lobby’s Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy

Question: Has the Israel Lobby always exerted
such powerful influence over U.S. foreign
policy; if not, when and how has this change
taken place?
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“Every Human being has multiple
identities; I am a human being – I am
Egyptian when Egyptians are
oppressed, I am Black when Blacks
are oppressed, I am Jewish when
Jews are oppressed, and I am
Palestinian when Palestinians are
oppressed.” – Shehata Haroun
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Introduction
In the first season of the well-known series House of Cards, the main
character, a Democratic majority leader in congress, derails the nomination for
Secretary of State by leaking documents which show that the nominee had allegedly
made anti-Israel comments. In response to this scandal, the Israeli Prime Minister
stated that the Secretary of Sate was anti-Semitic. The secretary of state fell under
severe attacks in the political scene; therefore, he was removed from his position
because the president-elect did not want to have an individual who had come under so
much fire in such a critical position. This episode exemplifies the importance of Israel
in American politics.
This summer of 2015 witnessed a very intense negotiation process between
Iran and the United States. Interestingly enough, the Israel Lobby was very involved
in this process. “The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) spent what
appears to be a record $1.67 million” (Ho, 2015, para 1) in order to enable the
Congress to acquire the power to “review…[the] Iran nuclear deal” (Ho, 2015, para
1). What is even more interesting than this enormous sum of money spent, is the fact
that AIPAC succeeded in its goal since a bill was passed and became an actual law
which “established a 60-day period for Congress to consider the agreement” (Ho,
2015, para 2). Regardless of the actual outcome of the Iran Nuclear deal, the Israel
Lobby wanted a review, and the Israel Lobby acquired the review. This very recent
example demonstrates the power that the Israel Lobby has today.
A previous ”deputy national security advisor in Israel” (Freilich, 2015) stated,
“AIPAC is not just a lobby… It is a magnificent creation of the American Jewish
community and other supporters of Israel, and has become a vital component of the
US-Israel relationship in its own right” (Freilich, 2015). This quote, just like the
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previously provided example, is important because it projects the power that AIPAC
currently holds. However, it also suggests that AIPAC had not always existed as a
member of the Israel Lobby; it had been established by certain people such as the
American Jewish community. Therefore, this project aims to investigate and
understand the Israel Lobby’s evolution and transformation over time. In addition to
this, the project aims to present that the Israel Lobby was not always able to influence
U.S. foreign policy, and has not always achieved its goals.
Conceptual FrameworkIn this project, I will evaluate the development of the Israel Lobby from the
late 1930s, specifically during the Holocaust years, until today by looking at theories
on lobbying and ethnic groups within the American political scene. According to Walt
and Mearsheimer, the Israel Lobby consists of different pro-Israel “individuals and
organizations” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 5) that aim to shift American “foreign
policy in a pro-Israel direction” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 5). Alison Weir,
from the Council for the National Interest (Weir, 2014) lists fifty-five organizations
that fall under the Israel Lobby.
It is important to note that most of the literature that is written about the Israel
Lobby tackles the subject from the foreign policy debate angle; whereas, this project
will mention six key organizations that are part of the lobby: the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP), Jewish
Council for Public Affairs (JCPA), the Emergency Committee For Israel (ECI), and
the American Jewish Committee (AJC) (Weir, 2014). These five have been chosen
based on the fact that they constantly appear throughout the literature. They will be
evaluated using existent theories on lobbying as well as influence.
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Therefore, this project will look at how and when the organizations associated
with the Israel lobby started to gain success in their efforts to “encourage legislators
to sponsor favorable legislation, craft legislation that conforms to its interests, change
the wording of a bill, and give prominent place on a committee's agenda to favorable
bills and amendments” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 777).
The method employed to observe the development of the Israel Lobby in this
project is theory guided process tracing. Theories of how lobbies function will be
used to evaluate the lobby’s strength and evolution. Hence, it will look at the Israel
Lobby and whether it conforms into these theories about lobbying. By tracing the
evolution of the Israel Lobby over time and by observing its ability to gain power, this
method will allow for the increased understanding not only of lobbies in general, but
also of whether the Israel Lobby functions appropriately within the theory or takes
extreme measures in order to fight for its causes. The project will explain the links
between the American Jewish community during the Holocaust, and the Israel Lobby
of today. Hence, it will show how the primary focus of American Jewry during the
Holocaust was that of seeking the safety of the European Jews who were being
harmed by the Nazis (Schoenbaum, 1993, p 26), and how this concern has now
transformed into one of supporting Israel by influencing U.S. foreign policy (Walt
and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 116). The purpose is to understand the way in which the
Israel Lobby was able to evolve to the point of power in American politics. Through
this project, findings show that during the Holocaust time period, the American
Jewish community lived in fear and disconnection from the European Jewry. By
1948, American Zionists were united for the cause of the state of Israel, but after their
goal was achieved their “proto-lobby” vanished. During the 1956 war, the Israel
Lobby appears to have been largely inactive, and by 1967 it did not play a major role
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since the American environment was already pro-Israel. It is only after 1967 that we
see a major shift in behavior amongst the American Jewish Community. By the 1973
war, the Israel Lobby was active in the political scene and able to influence foreign
policy issues related to Israel. After the 1973, the Israel lobby is able to develop itself
and become more aggressive in its method due to new leadership. With the case of the
2003 Iraq war, this strength becomes very obvious.
An appropriate client for this project is the Arab Lobby in the United States.
There are three significant organizations that fall under the Arab Lobby: the Arab
American Institute, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and the
National Network for Arab American Communities, all of which aim to target
American foreign policy matters that are relevant to the Arab world (“Foreign
Policy,” 2015) (“American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,” 2015) as well as
“empower the Arab American community” (“Mission & Vision,” 2014). Essentially,
by answering the questions raised in this project, the Arab Lobby, and specifically
these three organizations, can learn effective lobbying from the “magnificent
creation” (Freilich, 2015) of the Israel Lobby. They can learn how to gain power and
how to influence Congress in a way that promotes Arab interests. In addition to this,
as per Barari’s concern regarding the Arab world, the project will also provide a
deeper understanding of Jewish influences, and a significant modification of the
incorrect assumptions and “ideas” (Barari, 2009, p 4).
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
In this literature review, I will relay the contemporary academic debates on the
power and influence of the Israel lobby and relate it to general theories of lobbying
and the role of ethnic lobbying groups in US foreign policy. I will then use this debate
to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of the development and evolution
of the Israel Lobby from 1939 through today; there will be special emphasis on the
period between 1939 and 1967.

A.

The Israel Lobby Now

One of the first works to present the idea of the extreme power of the Israel
Lobby was Paul Findley’s (1985) book entitled They Dare to Speak Out. In this book,
Findley provides his own personal experience with the Israel Lobby, and then applies
that to the experience of other senators. Findley was a Republican congressman who
was “being opposed by pro-Israel activists because of...[his] work on Middle East
Policy” (Findley, 1985, p 19). He explains that he was never anti-Israel (Findley,
1985, p p.22); only trying to be fair with regard to Palestine. This was, however,
enough to eliminate him from congress. When Findley asked why this had happened
to him, “Doug Bloomfield, a friend on the AIPAC staff…[stated], “you were the most
visible critic of Israeli policy. That’s the best answer I can give” (Findley, 1985, p
23). Therefore, Findley’s entire book is trying to understand how and why the Israel
lobby was able to do this. Hence, the strength of this book is that the author is
speaking from a direct event that had happened to him. In addition, the source
provides an insider’s perspective on the lobby’s actions.
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Another critical study by an American scholar, Rubenberg (1986), has
proposed that “the objective power of the pro-Israeli groups grew tremendously in the
years after 1967” (Rubenberg, 1986, p 15), explicitly providing a historical
benchmark that underscores the Israel Lobby’s appearance as a power in American
political scene. Rubenberg (1986) uses a mixture of sources ranging from speeches to
academic books and biographies to document the relationship between Israel and the
United States, and includes a chapter on the Israel Lobby. She describes the lobby’s
main aim as being able to “assure Israel that its interests became American policy,
even as U.S. interests were compromised along the way” (Rubenberg, 1986, p
15).This statement is critical because it presents the Israel Lobby as having the
unusual power to push American foreign policy, even if they may be contrary to U.S.
interests. The depth and variety of the sources used in this work strongly support her
argument, even though she only devotes one chapter to the Israel Lobby.
Similar to Rubenberg (1986), Tivnan, (1987) and Lind (2002) also address the
extreme power of Israel Lobby in the United States. Both authors provide minimal
historical context and perspective about the creation of the Israel Lobby. With regard
to Tivnan (1987), he states “that most American Jews preferred to remain Americans”
(Tivnan, 1987, p 30). However, he does not emphasize on any of the necessary details
for such a claim; this further supports the point that literature on the Israel Lobby
tends to overlook the historical American Jewish community. As for Lind (2002), he
explains that the Israel Lobby is not one organization, and that different “groups”
(Lind, 2002) constitute it. He also states that “the Israel lobby is united not by a
consensus about Israeli policies but by a consensus about U.S. policies toward Israel”
(Lind, 2002). In his article, he mentions two major factors that, he believes, enable the
Israel Lobby to obtain such dominance: monetary power and reach within the
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government (Lind, 2002) (Rubenberg 1986). Lind (2002) suggests the Israel Lobby is
“far too powerful,” but similar to the case of Tivnan (1987), does not discuss the
reasons how and when this change has occurred.
Providing many answers to the gaps left open by Rubenberg (1986), Tivnan
(1987), and Lind (2002) is the book entitled The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign
Policy by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer (2007). This book, which “generated a
firestorm of criticism” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p viii), was “ground breaking”
(McDonald, 2007, p 33) because it was the first of its kind “to discuss the lobby’s role
in shaping U.S. policy” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p ix) In their book, Walt and
Mearsheimer (2007) go through every significant event in the Middle East in the late
20th century and early 21st century and tie them back to the Israel Lobby’s impacts.
For example, they discuss the Iraq war of 2003, the Lebanese War of 2006, and Iran.
Hence, Walt and Mearsheimer (2007) published a source that was much stronger than
the books that came before them. The variety of sources used in this book is
tremendous,

including

newspaper

articles,

governmental

and

congressional

documents, speeches by presidents, and research center publications to provide a
strong foundation for their argument.
In response to Walt and Mearsheimer’s provocative book, Foxman (2009),
President of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and Lieberman (2009) attempted to
counter the argument that the Israel Lobby has the capability to influence U.S. foreign
policy. However, there are certain ironies in their rebuttals that need to be noted. For
example, the ADL is considered to be a key component of the Israel Lobby (Weir,
2014). In addition to this, the information Foxman provides in order to counter Walt
and Mearsheimer’s (2007) arguments regarding terrorist organizations attacking the
U.S. because of the country’s “support to Israel” (Foxman, 2009, p 62), are from the

Bahnassy, 15	
  
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which is another member of the Israel
Lobby (Weir, 2014).
In addition to Foxman and Lieberman, there are several other authors who
argue against the extent of the Israel Lobby’s ability to influence U.S. foreign policy
(Freidberg, 2006) (Ross, 2006) (Ben-Ami, 2006) (Shultz, 2007). There is the voice of
Freedland (2009), who takes the middle ground between Walt and Mearsheimer
(2007), stating that the lobby does not control U.S. foreign policy, but it still has a
strong existence in the U.S. (Freedland, 2009).Like Freedland (2009), Verbeeten
(2006) argues that the Israel Lobby does not control U.S. foreign policy, but is still
“able to constrain or modify it [foreign policy]” in ways that benefit Israel
(Verbeeten, 2006).
What this controversy shows is the lack of genuine debate about the extent and
ability of the Israel Lobby to influence U.S. foreign policy is the application of
theories about how lobbies function, and how lobbying takes place to what the Israel
Lobby does. This application of theories on the Israel Lobby is needed because it will
enable us to understand how powerful the lobby really is, as well as when and how
the change took place.

B.

Lobbying

When authors discuss the influence of the Israel Lobby in specific, they fail to
do so through the techniques of lobbying such as those mentioned by Hojnacki and
Kimball (1998). Therefore, by mixing the specific Israel Lobby with the criteria for
powerful lobbying by Hojnacki and Kimball (1998), this presents a new perspective
of the issue. To add to that, it weakens the arguments by authors such as Foxman,
mentioned earlier, who very much oppose the argument that the Israel Lobby has
influence on U.S. foreign policy because these opposing authors also do not use
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general lobbying criteria to support their argument.
Therefore, to understand both the methods in which the Israel Lobby works,
the claims brought against it as being all-powerful, as well as the lobby’s history, it is
essential to discuss how lobbies function and are formed in general, as well as the
specific nature of lobbying groups that represent ethnic minorities. Shain (1994), in
his work “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” focuses on how “the American
political system” (Shain, 1994, p 812) enables different ethnic groups to play a part in
the political scene and have an important role in “U.S. foreign policy” (Shain, 1994, p
812). What is very significant about this piece is that the author refers to numerous
types of interest groups that exist in America: “Greek, Armenian, Irish, or Jewish
descent… African, Arab, Cuban, Filipino, Haitian, Korean, and Mexican” (Shain,
1994, p 812). Therefore, he first focuses on the general idea of lobbying, but also
provides historical examples of how different ethnic groups have played a role in
impacting American foreign policy. His sources are comprised of Academic books
and journals as well as newspaper articles; therefore, his research is extremely well
supported.
While Shain (1994) begins by giving general examples of interest groups,
Hojancki and Kimball (1998) move one step further by very concretely defining what
it means to lobby by devoting an entire section to the subject, which is a significant
strength of their article. They also add to Shain (1994) by discussing the technicalities
of lobbying. They emphasize that a predominant idea regarding lobbies’ behavior is
that they generally “are more likely to lobby their allies in committee than their
opponents or undecided members” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 775). They state
that this behavior changes when the lobby or organization starts to have connections
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with the “legislative district. It then can work directly to build coalitions in Congress
in addition to relying on legislative friends” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 775).
There are clear connections between Hojnack and Kimball’s description of
lobbies and Paul Findley’s They Dare to Speak Out. Findley was eliminated from
Congress because he was no longer regarded as an “ally” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 775); Findley’s example very openly presents the Israel Lobby’s evidence of
power. Hojnack and Kimball also explain that lobbying results in the following: “A
group will encourage legislators to sponsor favorable legislation, craft legislation that
conforms to its interests, change the wording of a bill, and give prominent place on a
committee's agenda to favorable bills and amendments” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998,
p 777). Therefore, the strength of this article is that it is extremely informative when
attempting to understand general lobby behavior.
Looking at lobbying from a dissimilar angle than Hojnacki and Kimball’s
(1998), Hall and Wayman (1990) look at the financial properties of lobbying. They
explain that money is actually critical in the lobbying process because it leads to
“access” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803). This access is essential because it
“Becomes an important proximate goal of the interest group pursuing a
legislative agenda. Access is central to stimulating agency. It gives the group
the opportunity to let otherwise sympathetic members (and their staffs) know
that some issue or up- coming activity is important to them” (Hall and
Wayman, 1990, p 803).
Therefore, it enables more people who have the power to control or change
policies to gather to your side. Hence, this study goes one step further than Hojnacki
and Kimball (1998) because it discusses the impact money has on lobbying. This
study emphasizes that there is a direct “connection between” (Hall and Wayman,
1990, p 814) money provided by lobbying “and the legislative involvement of
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sympathetic members” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 814). In addition to this, the
study underscores that the member of congress the money is provided to “already”
(Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 814) has to be in support of the cause (Hall and Wayman,
1990, p 814), which was also mentioned by Hojnacki and Kimball (1998).
Again, Hall and Wayman’s theories are very beneficial and can be applied to
the Israel Lobby. Lind (2002), for example, underscored how the Israel Lobby has
access to money and definitely uses it for its own interests. In addition, “Open
Secrets,” an organization that collects data on funds provided by different “interest
groups” (“OpenSecrets,” 2015), presents the names of all of the different
congressmen, as well as the amount of money they were paid by the Israel Lobby
between 2009 and 2015. For example, Marco Rubio received “$147, 430”
(“OpenSecrets,” 2015) as a Republican senator. He is currently running for president,
and although no exact statistics could be located presently about how much money he
has been provided by the Israel Lobby for this campaign, he did make a very clear
statement about Israel during the Republican presidential debates:
“There is no moral equivalence between Israel and those who seek to destroy
her…Understanding the fundamental truth is essential to being the next
Commander-in-Chief… It’s a struggle to safeguard the future of Israel”
(Rushing, 2015, para 3-4).
Similarly, Senator Kelly Ayotte who explains that "Israel is our closest and
most reliable ally in the Middle East,” (“Graham, Mendez, Ayotte,” 2014), and was
responsible for a resolution in Congress maintains Israel’s “right to self-defense”
(“Graham, Mendez, Ayotte,” 2014) during the war with Palestine in the summer of
2014, received “$151,048” from the Israel Lobby (OpenSecrets,” 2015). These
examples provide further evidence of the lobby’s power with regard to the application
of Hall and Wayman’s (1990) theory.
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Cumberlege (2004) writes about lobbying with regard to nursing rights.
However, her advice is extremely broad and can be applied to lobbying in general,
specifically with regard to how lobbies develop. For example, she provides simple
techniques and steppingstones as to how organizations can learn to be good lobbyists.
Firstly, she says they need to have a clear idea of what they want to accomplish. The
next step she emphasizes is for all backers of the case to be united together. The third
step is to look at the matter from the perspective of the individual or organization you
are attempting to lobby; she underscores that it is necessary the have the matter being
lobbied linked to the individual or organization you are lobbying.
Cumberlege (2004) and Terry (2005) both emphasize the necessity of having
“connections” (Cumberlege, 2004, p.30), even though Terry (2005) tends to delve
into more detail with regard to the Israel Lobby. A major strength in Terry (2005) is
the fact that she uses numerous historical examples of how lobbies function. As for
Grossman and Helpman (1994), they go one step further than both Cumberlege
(2004) and Terry (2005) because they provide detailed steps as to exactly how lobbies
attempt to acquire what they want. They claim that lobbies collect data that is in direct
support of their cause and present “it to powerful politicians” (Grossman and
Helpman, 1994, p 1). The lobbies also target the general public in order “to win voter
sympathy” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1). Thirdly, and very importantly,
lobbies occasionally act out obtrusively in an attempt to “coerce rather than persuade”
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1). Finally, lobbies pay money to anyone in the
political picture who can advance their cause. Therefore, the strength of Grossman
and Helpman (1994) is that they add on to Cumberlege (2004) and Terry (2005) and
this enables them to paint a clearer picture of how lobbies work
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Therefore, these previously mentioned theories on how lobbies work, acquire
influence, and the significance of money with regard to lobbying are important
because they enable us to evaluate the Israel Lobby’s power today. However, they
also enable us to look at the process and evolution of the lobby’s power over time and
when it became a key entity in American foreign policy creation. The previously
mentioned Tivnan (1994) mentioned 1967 as a turning point for the Israel Lobby.
However, he does not discuss the details of why this was so. Tivnan (1987) also
tackles the issue of the Israel Lobby by addressing a chapter to every U.S. president.
However, he does dedicate an entire chapter to the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC). Therefore, with Tivnan’s (1987) example, we see the obvious
flaw of failing to link theories on lobbying to the Israel Lobby, a theme that appears to
be lacking in most literature on the Israel Lobby. Thus, it is important to go back in
history in order to explore the Israel lobby from its very beginning and to question if
it was always the powerful entity that it is today.

C.

Was This Always the Case?

Looking at the American Jewish Community during the Holocaust reveals that
this community was the exact opposite of the Israel Lobby today. The American
Jewish community had an obvious lack of power during this specific time period. The
first most standard source to use in order to understand the American Jewish
community is Sarna (2004). The last two chapters of this book look at modern
American Jewish history specifically during WWII. Sarna underscores the antiSemitism apparent in the United States at the time.
Another significant source from the Shoah Research Center entitled American
Jewry and the Holocaust will be used. This source emphasizes the general trend in
lack of unanimity and cooperation among the American Jewry. The source also
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underscores the presence of anti-Semitism in America during World War II, which
drove the American Jewry to fear speaking up. It is important to note that the Shoah
Research Center is a good source of Jewish opinion since it dedicates all of its work
to the Holocaust; therefore, this is the center’s specialization. Another source entitled
Jewish Artists in New York: The Holocaust Years by Matthew Baigell also speaks in
great detail about the Anti-Semitism in the United States and even provides names of
famous anti-Semites and rallies organized to denounce Jews. The strength of this
book is that it speaks of specific events and figures that show how predominant the
phenomenon was. Therefore, with regard to the predominant anti-Semitism, these
sources are clearly aligned with one another and underscore the problems American
Jewish community faced during the Holocaust; they do not contradict each other on
this specific subject.
A final source is Bolkosky (2000). The author studies a specific case of the
reaction of the American Jews living in Detroit to the Jewish European Refugees
fleeing there from the Holocaust. The author explains that years before the Holocaust
began, there were clear signs of anti-Semitism in the United States since “American
supporters of Hitler marched in a parade in Washington, D.C…[whereby] the head of
the German-American bund, charged the American Jewish community with
sabotaging both the German and American economies by boycotting German goods”
(Bolkosky, 2000, p 309). Therefore, the source speaks of specific historical events
that clearly portray anti-Semitism in the American society. To add to that, the author
emphasizes that Jews in Detroit were advised not to speak up “against German
policies” (Bolkosky, 2000, p 310) by “national and Detroit Jewish organizations”
(Bolkosky, 2000, p 310). Therefore, this caused a clash between such Jewish
organizations

since,

for

example,

“leaders

of

the

American

Jewish

Bahnassy, 22	
  
Committee…opposed the attempts by the American Jewish Congress to organize
mass protest meetings” (Bolkosky, 2000, p 310), which signifies a lack of coherence
and cooperation between the Jewish organizations. Although the author speaks in
details of attempts to help the European Jews, he makes an extremely critical
statement: “it was as if the Jews of Europe and the Jews of America lived on different
planets. No rescue came from the Allies; and American Jews remained disunited”
(Bolkosky, 2000, p 315).
This specific case by Bolkosky (2000) is very significant because it
underscores all of the points mentioned by all of the previous authors and exemplifies
these points through a historical example. Therefore, the strength of this case is
twofold: the author uses a specific historical case of American Jewry and Jewish
refugees in Detroit, and secondly, he uses very critical sources to support the case
such as interviews with figures from Jewish organizations, the meeting minutes of
these organizations, and speeches.
As has been mentioned earlier, by looking at the historical context of the
American Jewry during the time of the Holocaust, this will reveal the stark contrast
between the disunity, lack of organization, and inability, if not reluctance, to pressure
the U.S. government to help the European Jews suffering under the Nazis and the
power, organization, and effectives of the Israel lobby today. This brief historical
section on the American Jewish community is essential because it provides a strong
foundation that will clearly reveal the evolution and obvious rise in power of the
Israel Lobby over time as will be shown through the different time periods, under
American presidents, that will be observed. Not only is this important because it
shows the progress made by the American Jewish community, but also because in all
of the gathered research, it has not been addressed from this perspective before.
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Sources generally speak of the Israel Lobby today, but they never tie it back to
the American Jewish community of the past, specifically during the Holocaust.
Tivnan (1987) attempts to do so but overly magnifies their role as well as speeds
through the event, leading to a flawed chapter. Even with the case of Schoenbaum’s
(1993), the focus of his book is not on the role of the Israel Lobby to influence U.S.
foreign policy, it is on the state of Israel and its struggle to exist. Therefore, authors
who speak of the Israel Lobby and its influence on U.S. foreign policy tend to
overlook the community’s past weakness. However, when the American Jewish
community’s past state is acknowledged and taken into account, this magnifies the
understanding of the sense of power that the Israel Lobby has reached today.
It is important to note that Schoenbaum (1993) mentions key organizations in
the U.S. such as the Zionist Organization of America, the American Zionist
Emergency Council, the Jewish Agency, and the American Jewish Council. He states
that these organizations had a role during the Holocaust; they wanted to “open the
doors of Palestine” (Schoenbaum, 1993, p 29) to the European Jews. However, he
also states that there was “a war among the Jews and the implicit deadlock among the
political authorities” (Schoenbaum, 1993, p 30), which clearly made initiatives by the
key organizations ineffective.
Hence, this information leads to an important and under-explored question:
how did the Israel Lobby transform into the “magnificent creation” (Freilich, 2015),
of the American Jewish Community (Freilich, 2015) who were themselves so
extremely weak at point in history, specifically during the Holocaust? According to
Rubenberg (1986), the situation began to evolve after 1967. Therefore, at which point
after 1939 did the American Jewish community begin to develop effectively the
powers explained by Hojnacki and Kimball’s (1998) and Hall and Wayman (1990).
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Did they follow through with Cumberlege’s (2004) description of what successful
lobbying entails? Answers to these interrelated questions will help us understand how
the lobby evolved to what it is now, and will also enable other lobbies to understand
the steps to take in order to reach this same position.
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology
To address the issue, it will be necessary to trace the history and development
of the Israel lobby for evidence of influence and access in accordance with Hojnacki
and Kimball (1998) as well as Hall and Wayman’s (1990) theories on lobbying. The
most appropriate method to do so is through historical-content analysis, which will
enable meticulous research to be done by looking at critical periods in history using
the lens of the previously mentioned lobbying theories. By doing so, it will be
possible to establish when the turning point for the lobby took place, and how this
happened.
The starting point of the project will be the Iraq case, the project will then go
back in history and start with the Holocaust time period. The Israel Lobby, its
creation, rise in power, and role in influencing U.S. foreign policy will be analyzed.
Specific cases will be discussed and analyzed such as the Holocaust time period, 1948
and the creation of the state of Israel, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the 1967 war, and the
Yom Kippur war of 1973. The aim of looking at these specific events in history is to
show the evolution of the ability of the Israel Lobby to fight for its cause, and the
degree in which it was able to influence U.S. foreign policy throughout these critical
years. Walt and Mearsheimer (2007) have discussed the more recent cases in which
the Israel Lobby played a part such as with the Lebanese War in 2006, Iraq (2003),
and Iran, and although they have very briefly mentioned the ACWAS issue of 1981
and the Lebanese War of 1982, they have focused on very little discussion of the
earlier conflicts of the Holocaust time period, 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Hence,
they do not target the general past that I aim to discuss; consequently, they have not
adequately discussed the way in which the lobby has attained the power that it
currently holds. Therefore, this project will look at earlier and critical conflicts, which
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will build on the later conflicts the Walt and Mearsheimer (2007) analyze, leading to a
full history of the Israel lobby.
The only case that will be regarded as a common denominator between Walt
and Mearsheimer and this thesis is the case of Iraq (2003). This case will be discussed
briefly in order to show that the Israel Lobby had attained power by the time of this
specific conflict, which will serve to provide a very stark contrast from the lobby’s
earlier history. Case studies are the most beneficial form of research in this situation
because they allow for a clear observation of the Israel Lobby’s behavior and will
reflect the extent to which the Israel Lobby is able influence U.S. foreign policy; this
will be beneficial because it will present the blatant contrast and lack of influence in
the lobby’s past.
In order to study the subject of the Israel Lobby, its evolution, and its
influence, extensive research is necessary. This will be done by looking at academic
and historical books that discuss the lobby’s creation. When discussing the lobby’s
current state, observing funding as well as financial contributions provided by the
Israel Lobby to specific U.S. senators will be critical because it will clearly show
which senators take the side of the lobby. Preliminary research shows that this
appears to be a circular process: the lobby funds specific senators, leading the
senators to voice the lobby’s opinions in Congress; the cycle continues in this way.
Therefore when looking at such funding, it will also be necessary to analyze congress
bills and votes by senators in order check that the senators' habits are in line with the
Israel Lobby's stances.
Like Walt and Mearsheimer, it will also be essential to analyze newspaper
articles because many statements included in these articles are made by senators
supporting the lobby as well as U.S. presidents. In addition to this, it will be necessary
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to look at the statements made by the various organizations that make up the lobby.
As mentioned in the Conceptual Framework section, the five organizations from the
Israel Lobby that will be mentioned are the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP), Jewish Council for Public Affairs
(JCPA), the Emergency Committee For Israel (ECI), and the American Jewish
Committee (AJC) (Weir, 2014) because of their constant reoccurrence in the
literature.
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Chapter 3: Lobby Power: The Case of Iraq 2003
The aim of this chapter is to show that the Israel Lobby had been active, long
before the war, in lobbying against Iraq. However, it remained rather quiet directly
before, as well as during the war (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 242), with the
exception of some resolutions. I argue that the quiescence of the Israel lobby in this
period was not the absence of clout, but a reflection of it. Given its access to key
leaders and its influence, it had already laid the groundwork for bi-partisan support of
the US invasion. Although the Israel Lobby was not the cause for war, it was able to
build a strong case against Iraq and the threat that it represented.
The influence enjoyed by the various components of the Israel lobby in 2003
would have been unimaginable 64 years earlier during the Holocaust, when the
American Jewish community was unorganized and reluctant to apply pressure on the
government. As this project will demonstrate, the lobby as it is today developed
slowly, with distinct differences in organizational capacity and influence evident in
1948, 1956, 1967, and finally, with the 1973 war, which I argue is the first time we
see the very organized system of lobbying that exists today. The Iraq War of 2003
shows a culmination of their efforts and their years of attempting to gain influence as
well as have their place in the American political scene.
A.

Background: Saddam Hussein and Israel

During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein appeared to have seen himself “as
the future leader of the Arab world” (Baram, 2012, para 22). “Saddam added, he
would tell Begin ‘[Y]our presence here, on this land [Israel before June 1967] is
illegal. [I will say] that they have to leave my [Arab] country’. Saddam thus implied
that he did not seek bloodshed per se but, rather, the demise of Israel” (Baram, 2012,
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para 22). Therefore, Israel’s existence was not a question with Saddam; he did not
want it to exist on its own terms, but only according to his. Hatred escalated when
Israel destroyed Iraq’s “nuclear reactor in…1981” (Baram, 2012, para 5). At the time
of the war with Iran, Hussein continued to hate Israel for being “the middleman”
(Baram, 2012, para 10) while Iran acquired weapons from the U.S. In 1990, Saddam
Hussein stated, “ I will burn half of Israel” (Baram, 2012, para 21). Then in 1991,
“Iraq fired 39 Scud missile” (Bard, n.d., para 15) against Israel. Thus, there were
obvious tensions between Iraq and Israel, and Saddam Hussein was openly vocal
against the state.
In 2002, Bush used the Central Intelligence Agency’s then classified
publication as a foundation for his argument to go to war in Iraq (Rosen, 2015, para
2). “The document determines that Saddam Hussein had an active chemical weapons
program” (Rosen, 2015, para 4). Not only this but, “the intelligence estimate also
heavily qualified its evidence of any link between Saddam's regime and al Qaeda,
noting that the sources were not entirely reliable” (Rosen, 2015, para 4). Thus, the
central issue between 2002 and 2003 was that the U.S. could either go to war in Iraq,
or abstain from such military action.

B.

Voice of the Lobby

According to one news article published on the 17th of October 2002 by
Matthew Berger, The Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations had
composed a resolution in which they stated that they were in complete support of
Bush’s decision to take action with regard to Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction and
stop weapons development programs” (Berger, 2002, para 2). Therefore the
Conference of Presidents’ resolution was composed four days (Berger, 2002, para 2)
before Bush had officially “signed” (“H.J.Res. 114 (107th),” 2002) this Iraq
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resolution of 2002. Berger notes that the final form of the Conference’s resolution
differed from the draft because the draft included the following statement: “the draft
had offered support only for unspecified presidential initiatives” (Berger, 2002, para
3), while the resolution in its final form replaced this sentence with the following:
“the use of force as a last resort and supports White House efforts to build U.N. and
other international backing” (Berger, 2002, para 3). What this difference presents is
that “use of force” (Berger, 2002, para 3) was in fact an option that was approved by
these organizations. The final resolution states,
“the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations affirms its support for President Bush and the
government of the United States in the war against global terrorism.
In this struggle, Iraq presents unique dangers. It possesses chemical
and biological weapons and, according to numerous accounts, could
have a nuclear capability in a short period of time. Such weapons of
mass destruction might be supplied to terrorist networks with a global
reach, including those who have targeted the United States and
others” (“Conference of Presidents Declares Support,” 2002, para 5).
Berger underscores that, generally, American Jewish organizations agreed
with this resolution and he named the Jewish Council for Public Affairs as well as the
Zionist Organization of America; however, he includes the American Jewish
Committee as the exception to the rule, whereby they thought “that it would be
inappropriate for Jewish groups to speak out on Iraq at this time” (Berger, 2002, para
15). When looking at this statement, the American Jewish Committee does not state
that it will never agree on the rest of the members of the Israel Lobby’s stance with
regard to Iraq; it just believed that this moment in history was not the correct “time”
(Berger, 2002, para 15). So, there was a possibility for it to change its stance when the
time was right for it to do so.
All of the four previously mentioned organizations are part of the Israel Lobby
(Weir, 2014). Berger’s conclusion is also inline with Michelle Goldberg’s article
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which was published in 2002 as well. Similarly, Goldberg cites the opinions of
several American Jewish organizations about the Iraq war, clearly before it had
occurred. He explains that generally, most of these American Jewish organizations
support the idea of going to war. For example, “Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice
chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations,
says, ‘In the American Jewish community, there’s a great deal of support for the
president’s stand’” (Goldberg, 2002, para 4). In this discourse, we are able to see,
generally, a unified position within the Israel Lobby. To add to that, what is very
important about this article is that it makes very clear the established link between
Iraq and Israel: Saddam Hussein (Goldberg, 2002, para 4). In support of this point, in
a recently published article in 2013, until Saddam’s very final moment he is recorded
to have stated: “‘Death to America! Death to Israel! Long live Palestine! Death to the
Persian magi!,’ ” (“Executioner,” 2013, para 2). So, his anti-Israel sentiments were
never a secret. The section at the beginning of this chapter regarding the tension
between Israel and Iraq also underscores the threat posed by Saddam.
Walt and Mearsheimer also emphasize “Jewish organizations’ ” (Walt and
Mearsheimer, 2007, p 243) stance with regard to Iraq, but they go even one step
further by citing an article that observed:
“the attitudes of most American Jews toward the war itself. According
to a 2007 Gallup Organization study based on the results of thirteen
polls taken since 2005, American Jews are significantly more opposed
to the Iraq war (77 percent) than the general American public (52
percent). With respect to Iraq, the larger and wealthier pro-Israel
organizations are clearly out of step with the broader population of
American Jews” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 243).
Very relevant to the previous paragraph, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs (JCPA)
made the following official statement:
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(“JCPA”, 2002).
When observing the first document mentioned in JCPA’s official statement, it
appears that there were two resolutions regarding Iraq on the same day in 1998. One
of these resolutions was entitled “Resolution on the Iraq Crisis” (“JCPA”, 1998). This
resolution sees that it is essential to rid Saddam Hussein of his “weapons of mass
destruction” (“JCPA”, 1998), and it mentions “Unscom, [which] was established to
oversee the destruction of Iraq's missile, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
programs” (“JCPA”, 1998). The document then concludes by saying that it sides with
the American government “in its decision to maintain military preparedness as may
be needed” (“JCPA”, 1998). Therefore, it openly believes that if the American
government takes armed action against Iraq, this would be justified. As for the second
resolution, it is entitled the “Resolution on Solidarity with Israel During the Iraq
Crisis” (“JCPA”, 1998). This time, it does not only focus on Iraq, but it also discusses
the issue of Israel. The text presents the idea that Saddam Hussein is armed and
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“evidently continues to possess the capacity to launch missiles armed with
conventional and possibly non-conventional weapons as well” (“JCPA”, 1998),
meaning the JCPA is not assuming that he has these weapons, but it is ensuring that
he does and it adds that it wants the American government to openly announce
“recent statements by senior American officials affirming Israel's right of selfdefense” (“JCPA”, 1998). What this resolution presents is that the Israel Lobby had
been focused on Iraq for many years, and that this attention directed at Saddam and
Iraq did not just start in 2001 after 9/11. The lobbying had obviously been taking
place for years.
Almost one week after the 9/11 attacks, William Kristol penned the “open
letter to the President [Bush]” (Kristol, 2001), which “was signed by 41 leading”
(Avnery, 2003) neoconservatives. The main idea behind this letter was to encourage
Bush to focus on four areas: Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Hizbullah in Lebanon
(Kristol, 2001). With regard to Iraq, he stated that there may have been a possible
connection between Saddam Hussein and Bin Laden, however “even if evidence does
not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism
and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq” (Kristol, 2001). Drawing parallels to the Iraq war in 2003, with regard
to the Iran Nuclear Deal and the previously mentioned intense negotiation process in
the introduction, there was a senator named Tom Cotton who penned the “letter of
47” (“Letter from Senate Republicans,” 2015), directed at the Iranian government.
Tom Cotton’s “senate campaign cost $13.9 million…[and] that doesn’t include the
nearly one-million-dollar contribution in supportive political advertising made by Bill
[William] Kristol’s Emergency Committee for Israel” (Clifton and Lobe, 2015).
Therefore, how ironic is it to make the connection that William Kristol’s organization,
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the Emergency Committee for Israel, is part of the Israel Lobby (Weir, 2014)? This is
the same man who wrote the letter to Bush promoting the war on Iraq, and the same
man who helped finance Cotton, who fought the Iran Nuclear Deal. So it appears that
Senator Tom Cotton had followed Kristol’s method so many years later in 2015. It
must be noted that the Emergency Committee for Israel is composed of both
“Republican Party neoconservatives and Evangelical Christians” (Weir, 2014).
According to Walt and Mearsheimer, these neoconservatives were publishing articles
in the news in order to propagate the idea for the Iraq War (Walt and Mearsheimer,
2007, p 248). Such publications by such individuals were actually used “to reinforce
the arguments made by Bush administration insiders” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007,
p 250). Therefore, when Walt and Mearsheimer link the neoconservatives to the Israel
Lobby this is the reason why:
“key leaders of the major pro-Israel organizations lent their voices to
the campaign for war. Of course, many of the neoconservatives
themselves had close ties to these organizations. In mid-September
2002, when the selling of the war was just getting under way, Michelle
Goldberg wrote in Salon that “mainstream Jewish groups and leaders
are now among the strongest supporters of an American invasion of
Baghdad” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 241).
In an interview with Congressman Nick Rahall, he affirms the link between
the Israel lobby and these neoconservatives by stating,
“there is no doubt a link between the Israeli lobby and the
neoconservatives that continues to this day. A closer examination will
reveal such in the backgrounds, public statements, and positions taken
over the entire careers of those who led us into the Iraq War and even
worse, the disastrous decisions made in the immediate aftermath” (N.

Rahall, personal communication, March 23, 2016).
Therefore, when relating this to lobby literature, as has been mentioned in the
literature review section, these neoconservatives appear to be the Israel Lobby’s
“connections” (Cumberlege, 2004, p.30) in the U.S. government during the prelude to
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the Iraq war. This method is underscored by both Cumberlege (2004) and Terry
(2005). Therefore, when Grossman and Helpman state that “they [interest groups]
gather information that supports their positions and make it available to powerful
politicians” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1), this shows that the Israel Lobby was
actually one step ahead because they had become linked to the neoconservatives
within the American government. They did not need to supply these “powerful
politicians” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1) with information in order to gain
their backing because the support was already there.

C.

The American Government’s Stance

According to Krugman, “America invaded Iraq because the Bush
administration wanted a war” (Krugman, 2015, para 3). However, according to Bush
this was not always the case. When he was asked about this issue, he stated:
“No president wants war. Everything you may have heard is that, but
it’s just simply not true. My attitude about the defense of this country
changed on September the 11th. We — when we got attacked, I vowed
then and there to use every asset at my disposal to protect the
American people. Our foreign policy changed on that day, Helen. You
know, we used to think we were secure because of oceans and
previous diplomacy, but we realized on September the 11th, 2001, that
killers could destroy innocent life. And I’m never going to forget it.
And I’m never going to forget the vow I made to the American people
that we will do everything in our power to protect our people. Part of
that meant to make sure that we didn’t allow people to provide safe
haven to an enemy. And that’s why I went into Iraq” (“Helen Thomas
Asks President Bush,” 2006, para 7).
What can be understood from Bush’s reply is that the American government
became inclined to go to war in 2003 only due to September 11th, and although Bush
does not mention any concrete facts he had about the link between Iraq and 9/11, he
claims “I also saw a threat in Iraq. I was hoping to solve this problem
diplomatically…And when he [Hussein] chose to deny inspectors, when he chose not to
disclose, then I had the difficult decision to make to remove him.” (“Helen Thomas
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Asks President Bush,” 2006, para 13 - 15).
According to the U.S. Senate’s official website, the resolution to go to war in Iraq
passed with “77 yeas and 23 nays” (“U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes,” n.d.), which is
obviously a significant majority. This data reveals that the members of congress were
inclined to go to war. The decision did not come from the president since in this case he
does not have the authority. If the Congress was not initially inclined to go to war, the
roll call would not have appeared with such results since there seems to have been
general consensus on the issue.

D.

The Outcome

From the previous quote by Walt and Mearsheimer emphasizing the link
between the lobby and the neoconservatives with power in the American government,
there is evidence to suggest the Israel Lobby had established sufficient access and
influence to nudge foreign policy in a direction that fit their interests. Almost one year
after these efforts, the Iraq resolution entitled “Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002” (“H.J.Res. 114 (107th),” 2002) was approved.
The process happened very quickly according to the timeline relayed on the website
dedicated to presenting such governmental documents; it was first “introduced [on]
October 2nd, 2002” (“H.J.Res. 114 (107th),” 2002). It then moved forward in the
“House” (“H.J.Res. 114 (107th),” 2002) and the “Senate” (“H.J.Res. 114 (107th),”
2002), and by “October 16th, 2002…the president [Bush] signed the bill and it
became law” (“H.J.Res. 114 (107th),” 2002). Below are sections from the completed
resolution that are most relevant to the thesis:

cluded that Iraq’s continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international
peace and security, declared Iraq to be in ‘‘material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations’’ and urged the President ‘‘to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into
compliance with its international obligations’’;
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security
of the United States and international peace and security in
the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable
breach of its international obligations by, among other things,
continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and
biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons
H. J. Res. 114—2
capability, and supporting
and harboring terrorist organizations;
and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate,
Whereas
Iraqforpersists
in violating
the United
or account
non-Iraqi
citizens resolution
wrongfullyofdetained
by Nations
Iraq,
including an American serviceman, and by failing to return propSecurity
Council
by
continuing
to
engage
in
brutal
repression
erty wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;
of its 2002,
civilian
therebyhasthreatening
international
peace
Whereas
the current
demonstrated
its capability
(H.J.Res.114,
ppopulation
2) Iraqi regime
and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other
nations and its own people;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing
hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States,
including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President
Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United
States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;
Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests,
including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are
known to be in Iraq;
Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the
lives and safety of United States citizens;
Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001,
underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist
organizations;
Whereas Iraq’s demonstrated capability and willingness to use
weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi
regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise
attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide
them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme
magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and
its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by
the United States to defend itself;
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990)
authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United
Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent
relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities
that threaten international peace and security, including the
(H.J.Res.114,
2002,ofp 3)
development
weapons of mass destruction and refusal or
obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);
Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102–1), Congress has authorized
the President ‘‘to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order
to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660,
661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677’’;
Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that
it ‘‘supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against
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cratic government to replace that regime;
Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the
United States to ‘‘work with the United Nations Security Council
to meet our common challenge’’ posed by Iraq and
to ‘‘work
Bahnassy,
38	
  
for the necessary resolutions,’’ while also making clear that ‘‘the
Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just
demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be
unavoidable’’;
Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war
on terrorism and Iraq’s ongoing support for international terrorist
groups combined with its development of weapons of mass
destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991
cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions
make clear that it is in the national security interests of the
United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that
all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be
enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;
Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war
on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding
requested by the President to take the necessary actions against
international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including
those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue
to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists
and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such persons or organizations;
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to
take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in
the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force
(Public Law 107–40); and
Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States
to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf
region: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002’’.

(H.J.Res.114, 2002, p 4)

These points highlighted from the resolution are the justification for why the
U.S. needed to invade Iraq and remove Saddam. Most of the reasons above linked
Saddam to the tragic 9/11 attacks; therefore, it was presented in the method that
America was protecting itself even though there were experts who attempted to
explain that there was no need for such a war. One example is Brent Scowcroft who
was a “national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W.
Bush” (Scowcroft, 2002). In his article published in 2002, he explains that there is no
reason the U.S. should go to war with Iraq since “there is scant evidence to tie
Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed
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Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is
little incentive for him to make common cause with them” (Scowcroft, 2002, para 5),
and that going to war would actually lead to more harm rather than help. While the
war was taking place, 27 “diplomats and military leaders” (“On a Statement,” 2004)
published a very critical message in which they stated that:
“The government was ‘motivated more by ideology than by reasoned
analysis.’ It has ‘led the United States into an ill-planned and costly
war from which exit is uncertain. It justified the invasion of Iraq by
manipulation of uncertain intelligence about weapons of mass
destruction, and by a cynical campaign to persuade the public that
Saddam Hussein was linked to Al Qaeda and the attacks of September
11. The evidence did not support this argument’" (“On a Statement,”
2004, para 2).
This quote shows that the American government had decided to go against
what was reasonable and acted irrationally when it went to war in Iraq in 2003.
1.

The Lobby’s Influence

If it was already established prior to 2003 that the Iraq war was not the best
idea, it is essential to look at the lobby’s influence in relation to such a decision of
going to war. In an interview with Lara Friedman, the Director of Policy and
Government Relations at Americans for Peace Now, she rejected the idea of the lobby
having influence in 2003. When I asked if her organization was a member of the
Israel Lobby, she stated: “absolutely, so if the Israel Lobby is defined as groups who
are working…because they care about Israel and that is their mission, then absolutely,
sure” (L. Friedman, personal communication, March 14, 2016). When asked about the
role of the Israel Lobby during the Iraq war, she firmly states:
“As someone who was working on Capitol Hill at that time, there is
no doubt in my mind that there were people working very hard on
Capitol Hill to convince people to support the Iraq war. Some of those
people had nothing to do with Israel, some of those people were
Jewish. From what I saw, I saw no evidence at any time, and I am a
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pretty well-connected person on the Hill, that AIPAC was actively
lobbying for the Iraq war. Zero. And I am someone who collects every
piece of paper that they distribute. I don’t think that is accurate, I
think it is accurate to say that when you look at the list of people who
were most enthusiastic about the Iraq war, many of those are the
neocons and many of those people are also very enthusiastic on the
right wing of Israeli politics. That doesn’t mean that this was a
conspiracy of the Jewish lobby. I will say that we as a Jewish
organization [Americans for Peace Now] stayed out of this. This was
outside of our mission and we didn’t take any position at all. I know
that there are people on my board who felt one way or the other, we
did not take a position and I did not see AIPAC in any way playing
that role as an organization” (L. Friedman, personal communication,
March 14, 2016).
In contrast to Lara Friedman’s statement, I asked Congressman Nick Rahall about the
role that the Israel Lobby played during the Iraq war. He explained:
“Yes, I believe the Israel lobby did play a part in leading the U.S. into
the Iraq War of 2003 (which I voted against). It must be stressed,
however, that it was a very silent role as the lobby knowing full well the
division among not only the American people, but among Jewish
Members of Congress, as well, that they best hide their fingerprints. So
its influence on some key members of Congress was a behind the scenes
and plausible deniability existed all around” (N. Rahall, personal

communication, March 23, 2016).
Both Lara Friedman and Nick Rahall agree on the fact that the Israel Lobby
was not openly active during the war. However, they differ in regards to whether
components of the lobby utilized their influence to change the vector of US foreign
policy. The difference is that during this period we see members of the lobby trying
not to be too “vocal” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 241). The low profile of the
lobby in this period may be a result of the fact that the majority of American Jews had
voted for the democratic candidate Al Gore, and only a minority of 19% had voted for
Bush (“U.S. Presidential Elections,” 2001). Alternatively, they may not have wanted
matters to look as if “too open support for an invasion would make it look like the war
was being fought for Israel’s sake” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 241). Thus, their
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method of action was very similar to the Holocaust time period, which will be seen in
the following chapter; however, there was an entirely different shift in power and
influence. Although, according to Waxman, they were afraid of being attacked due to
“an anti-Semitic backlash” (Waxman, 2009, p 8). This is highly unlikely; it makes
more sense that the Israel Lobby was actually afraid of being singled out as having
too much power.
What we do know is that AIPAC was in the picture prior to the war since three
years before it had taken place, in 2000, it was lobbying congress with regard to Iraqi
sanctions. This is an example of what AIPAC sent:
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(AIPAC Action Alert,” 2000)
Linking AIPAC’s message to lobby literature, “groups have two primary
legislative goals when a bill is referred to committee: (1) expand the size of their
supportive coalition and (2) affect the content and fate of proposed legislation”
(Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 775). In this specific case, they were doing both
because they wanted more congressmen to support their position. In addition to this,
with regard to legislation, they clearly want the document to be adopted. Hojnack and
Kimball explain that organizations that lobby and use “vigorous advocates for its
interests is likely to have a greater chance of achieving its policy objectives than”
(Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 778) organizations that use passive methods to gain
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support. Hence, AIPAC was clearly constantly lobbying against Iraq, since it was
doing so three years prior to the Iraq War.
Therefore, to conclude this chapter, according to Dov Waxman, “like the
neoconservatives, pro-Israel and American Jewish organizations all adhere to the
tenet that American and Israeli interests are completely compatible” (Waxman, 2009,
p 8). Therefore, this statement will be made especially clear in the chapter on the 1973
war. It was clear that the Israel Lobby in 2003 had followed the same method of
thinking. Thus, the way the Israel Lobby phrases its “interests” (Waxman, 2009, p 8)
is directly linked to achieving influence and its goals. In addition to this, as has been
seen with the case of the neoconservatives, the Israel Lobby was also able to become
friends with the right people who were able to promote these “interests” (Waxman,
2009, p 8) and integrate them into US foreign policy, even when the lobby had
remained generally silent during the war, which has been affirmed in the interview
with Lara Friedman and underscored by Congressman Nick Rahall as well. Therefore,
although the Israel Lobby did not cause, or lead to, the Iraq war, it was able to
establish acceptance that Iraq was a threat to Israel and the United States. This chapter
underscores that the Israel Lobby during the 2003 Iraq war had already laid the
ground work; the aim of the following chapters will be to understand how they had
reached this powerful position by going back in history and studying the lobby and its
role.
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Chapter 4: The American Jewry During the HolocaustHumble Beginnings
The aim of this chapter is to show that, although some American Jewish
organizations attempted to help the European Jewry, these attempts focused on
supporting their entry to Palestine through organizations like American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee (JDC), and not on lobbying the United States government to
take action or admit refugees. There was no evidence of a lobby or lobbying
organizations as exists today. In this chapter, we will see the disconnection between
American Jewry and European Jewry during the Holocaust, and the reason behind this
existent rift. Generally, American Jews felt disinterest, but also fear of being singled
out in the American society; therefore, there was the feeling of choosing assimilation,
and wanting to hide from anti-Semitism. In addition to this, the chapter will also
discuss the American government’s stance with regard to the Jewish refugees
escaping the Nazis.
In 1939, an incident occurred which underscored that there was no pressure
from the American Jewish Community on the U.S. president in any way. The SS St.
Louis had “more than 900 Jews,” aboard (Lanchin, 2014, para 1). These European
Jews were considered to be refugees who merely wanted to escape the Nazis in
Germany (Lanchin, 2014, para 1) who destroyed synagogues and seized assets that
were owned by Jews (Lanchin, 2014, para 6). However, this story’s happy ending for
the refugees seemed to be very prolonged. Upon reaching the destination, Cuba, the
officers did not allow these European Jews to leave the ship (Lanchin, 2014, para 23).
Interestingly, “the Cubans had already decided to revoke all but a handful of the visas
- probably out of fear of being inundated with more refugees fleeing Europe”
(Lanchin, 2014, para 24). This statement actually shows that these Jewish refugees
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had initially escaped Germany and legally had entry visas into Cuba. However, the
Cubans disregarded these documents. When the ship’s captain found that there was no
use in remaining in Cuba since the European Jews would not be allowed inside, he
navigated the ship to Florida. However, the result was another disappointment since
“US authorities also refused it the right to dock, despite direct appeals to President
Franklin Roosevelt” (Lanchin, 2014, para 25).
The only remaining alternative for the ship’s captain was to return to Germany
(Lanchin, 2014, para 26). Miraculously, four European countries decided to distribute
the Jewish refugees amongst themselves: “Belgium, France, Holland and the UK”
(Lanchin, 2014, para 29). All credit must be given to the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee (JDC), which arranged with the governments of these four
countries to accommodate all costs for the refugees (Lanchin, 2014, para 29). It is,
however, important to emphasize that “two-hundred-and-fifty-four other passengers
from the St Louis were not so fortunate and were killed as the Nazis swept across
Western Europe” (Lanchin, 2014, para 33).
Why is the story of SS St. Louis important? How does it relate to the Israel
Lobby’s evolution in power? Primarily, if the Israel Lobby was existent and powerful
at the time of the St. Louis it may have been able to pressure the U.S. government to
allow the European Jews to seek asylum in the U.S. However, there was obviously
not enough pressure from the American Jewish community to bring about such a
decision. Although the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) was
able to help these European Jewry by splitting them between the four previously
mentioned European countries, it did so outside of the realm of the U.S. It could only
help them in Europe. Therefore, it is exactly as Freilich has stated previously, the
Israel lobby was not always existent, and it had been established at a specific period
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in history. The story of the SS St. Louis demonstrates that the American Jewish
Community lacked the organization or clout to convince the U.S. president to accept
this very minimal number of European Jews who were escaping to save their lives.

A.

The American Government’s Stance

Firstly, it is necessary to establish the American government’s attitude towards
refugees. It was actually very difficult for the European Jewish refugees to gain entry
into America due to rules and regulations. Although Franklin Roosevelt is said to
have made statements about aiming to decrease rules of entry for the European Jews,
“those were only words, and ideas. Roosevelt and his administration never even tried
to ease the immigration restrictions” (Druks, 2002, p 3). It was actually the exact
opposite of this that happened since the American government caused the process to
become even more tangled up, therefore making “it more difficult for them to enter
the United States” (Druks, 2002, p 3). As early as 1924, there was an immigration act
set in place which restricted the number of immigrants flowing into the U.S.,
therefore setting a “quota” (“The Immigration Act of 1924,” n.d., para 1) on the
number that America could accept. By the time Hitler had become the ruler in
Germany, Jews were escaping in “mass” (“Obstacles to Immigration,” 2016, para 1)
numbers. However, one major problem that caused an impediment for the Jews was
the occurrence of the Great Depression (“Obstacles to Immigration,” 2016, para 5);
this caused Americans to worry about a rise in “competition” (“Obstacles to
Immigration,” 2016, para 5) believing that potential job opportunities might be lost to
the incoming immigrants (“Obstacles to Immigration,” 2016, para 5). In addition to
this, the requirements for accepting European Jews escaping the Holocaust became
excessively difficult. For example, the U.S. rejected:

Bahnassy, 47	
  
“Jewish refugees trained in the professions and, potentially, anyone
who did not have a guaranteed job upon arrival in the United States.
Finally, the State Department established additional bureaucratic
impediments, such as the need to provide certificates of good conduct
from the German police” (Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 2016, para 7).
Thus, under Roosevelt, in simple terms, it is safe to state that “the flow of
refugees slowed to a trickle between 1941 and 1945” (Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
2016, para 17), which are ironically the most critical years in which they should have
been accepted in large numbers due to the events in Europe. In this specific case, as is
with the case of the St. Louis, if the American Jewish community was powerful
enough, it would have been able to put pressure on the American government to
change its policies. The following section of this chapter aims to analyze exactly why
this was not the case with regard to the American Jewish community.

B.

The American Jewish Community during the Holocaust

To further understand the American Jewish community, it is essential to look
at their attitudes taken toward the European Jews specifically during the time of the
Holocaust. With regard to the American Jewish community, away from the American
government, an article published by the Shoah Resource Center tackles two extremely
significant issues with regard to the American Jewry during the Holocaust: they were
apprehensive of voicing their opinions and they also had an absence of “[unity]…and
lacked a central representative organization like those that existed in other countries”
(“American Jewry and the Holocaust,” para 1). The document further explains that it
was due to these reasons, as well as lack of coordination between the American
Jewry, that the American Jewish community was “ineffective at rescuing their Jewish
brethren in Europe during the Holocaust” (“American Jewry and the Holocaust,” para
1).
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The document discusses clashes between different American Jewish
organizations that occurred because they wanted to approach the Hitler and Nazi
problem using different methods. For example, the Jewish Labor Committee was
completely opposed to any and all links to Hitler’s government (“American Jewry and
the Holocaust,” para 2), but still promoted aiding the European Jews while the
Holocaust took place by attempting to provide them “with all possible help”
(Hertzberg, 1997, p 282). As for the American Jewish Committee (AJC), it preferred
different methods such as “[diplomacy…and] behind-the-scenes negotiations”
(“American Jewry and the Holocaust,” para 2). As for the case of the American
Jewish Congress, they seemed to follow a more out-spoken path of voicing their
opinions through “protest rallies, demonstrations, and boycotts” (“American Jewry
and the Holocaust,” para 2). Therefore, these are three separate American Jewish
organizations that chose very different mechanisms of reacting to Hitler, his Nazi
government, and policies. As a result of this, “there was no single American Jewish
voice to appeal to the American government for help” (“American Jewry and the
Holocaust,” para 3). In relation to this, Schoenbaum refers to several organizations in
the U.S. such as the Zionist Organization of America, the American Zionist
Emergency Council, the Jewish Agency, and the American Jewish Council. He
explains that these organizations did play a part during the Holocaust; they wanted to
“open the doors of Palestine” (Schoenbaum, 1993, p 29) to the European Jews, which
is the epitome of Zionism; therefore, the organizations made the issue central to
another region rather than their own country. However, he also states that there was
“a war among the Jews and the implicit deadlock among the political authorities”
(Schoenbaum, 1993, p 30), which clearly made initiatives by the key organizations
ineffective. In addition to this, it is interesting to point out that the American Jewish
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Conference’s important points regarding the safety of European Jews as well as their
possessions was only formulated in 1947 (“Jews Ask Allies For Indemnity From
Germany,” 1947, p 8), after the Holocaust had already taken place. Therefore, this
specific organization’s initiative did not occur as the event happened, but only after
the war had ended.
Interestingly, the article by the Shoah Resource Center also tackles another
very important issue, that of assimilation and identity among American Jews. For
example,
“Many of those American Jews working in the government were often more
American than Jewish, and did not want to take on the responsibility of
representing all of American Jewry, nor did they want to risk their jobs on a
purely Jewish issue.” (“American Jewry and the Holocaust,” para 4).
The article provides the name of Henry J. Morgenthau, who worked in the
American government as “Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury,” (“American Jewry
and the Holocaust,” para 3) as an exception to the rule whereby he pushed the
American president to create the War Refugee Board (WRB) (“American Jewry and
the Holocaust,” para 3) which aimed at helping the European Jewish refugees.
However, this entity was characterized as occurring after the event, and unfortunately
much “too late” (“American Jewry and the Holocaust,” para 3). If Morgenthau had
not held such a high position in the American government, who would have rallied for
the cause of helping the European Jews? By observing the nonexistent coordination
and cooperation, it seems that no one would have had the ability to do so. The Shoah
Resource Center emphasizes that what the American Jews were able to do was work
together to collect money “for Jews in Europe and Palestine” (“American Jewry and
the Holocaust,” para 4); so, it was very much mostly financial help. The source names
two such American Jewish organizations: the United Jewish Appeal and the
previously mentioned American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.
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The final issue that appears to have been very predominant in the U.S. during
the Holocaust is that of anti-Semitism. This phenomenon caused the American Jews
to refrain from speaking out against Hitler because they “fear[ed]… losing their jobs
or being shunned by their neighbors” (“American Jewry and the Holocaust,” para 4).
This point regarding anti-Semitism apparent in the U.S. during the time of the
Holocaust is emphasized in numerous other sources. For example, according to
Matthew Baigell, Henry Ford’s name appears as having pushed forward “anti-Semitic
campaigns through the late 1930s” (Baigell, 2002, p 4). By the 1940s, there were
openly anti-Semitic “rallies” (Baigell, 2002, p 4). For example, the Christian Front
targeted both synagogues as well as “Jewish businesses” (Baigell, 2002, p 4). Another
example of anti-Semitism occurred by the German-American Bund rally “in 1939…
[which] attracted between 19,000 and 22,000 people” (Baigell, 2002, p 4), which are
undoubtedly very large numbers. In reaction to these acts of hostility and
aggressiveness, the American Jewry were told to attempt to fit into the American
society without “draw[ing]…attention to themselves as Jews” (Baigell, 2002, p 4).
Therefore, they were being asked to keep their identity and religion discrete in order
to remain safe.
Sidney Bolkosky’s case study reinforces Baigell’s statements. Bolkosky
observes the relationship between the American Jews in Detroit and the German Jews
who escaped Nazism (Bolkosky, 2000, p 309). Like Baigell, he also explains that
there were supporters of Hitler and his regime that roved the American streets
(Bolkosky, 2000, p 309) and denounced the Jews by claiming that it was the
American Jews who were hurting the “German and American economies by
boycotting German goods” (Bolkosky, 2000, p 309). These American supporters of
Hitler made very anti-Semitic accusations against the American Jewry. Just as Baigell
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described the American Jewish response to these hateful accusations, Bolkosky agrees
by explaining that “both national and Detroit Jewish organizations discouraged public
protests against German policies” (Bolkosky, 2000, p 310). In addition to this,
“leaders of the American Jewish Committee…opposed the attempts by the American
Jewish Congress to organize mass protest meetings” (Bolkosky, 2000, p 310), which
shows an example of two American Jewish organizations that had very obviously
clashing opinions as well as methods of functioning. Therefore, out of fear, the
American Jews were silenced.
Thus, according to one author:
“In the thirties, even secular options of Jewish identity began to
disintegrate…The mass of American Jews- immigrant and native-bornlooked upon Jewishness and Judaism as disabilities, liabilities, and
impediments to becoming full Americans” (Baigell, 2002, p 5).
Similarly to the previous quote, Biagell also includes an anecdote in which he
states that “as a child growing up in New York in the early 1940s…[he was] being
told to try to ‘pass’” (Baigell, 2002, p 5), meaning to attempt to fit into the American
society without having anyone notice the fact that he was Jewish. Another important
example is the fact that the American Jewish Committee attempted to limit all
activities that drew attention and emphasized distinctions between “American Jews
from other American citizens” (Druks, 2001, p 5).
This terror of anti-Semitism and fear of gaining attention is what led the
American Jewish community to prefer assimilation. This is extremely evident in the
primary sources collected from the Library of Congress. In the first primary source,
which is an article that appeared in the Jewish Advocate, the author discusses the
struggles faced by Jewish refugees escaping to America. He explains that “the
immigrants need not only a place to sleep, or food to eat, but also the feeling of being
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welcome and not being looked at as if they are unwanted invaders” (Carpey, 1939, p
1). Therefore, he is asking the American Jewish community to become more
accepting, as well as create less of a distinction between the two Jewish communities.
He also emphasizes that
“‘The reaction of the American Jews towards the newcomers is very
hesitating, sometimes really unfriendly. They are ready to spend money
up to a certain amount, but only seldom ready to help the strangers in
their attempts to acclimatization…the most truthful advice they give [to
the European Jews]: ‘go to another place, to another town, to another
state! This is not the right place for you’…” (Carpey, 1939, p 1).
Therefore, what this author is trying to underscore is that the European Jews felt very
unwelcomed by the assimilated American Jews. Building on this point, another
author whose article was also published in the Jewish Advocate states that
“We sometimes like to indulge in wishful thinking about the strength of
the American Jewish community and to think…of the mantle of world
Jewish leadership as having fallen upon our communities. The truth is,
as every observed [Sic.] of the American Jewish scene knows, that
American Jewry is neither able nor willing to accept the responsibility
of building for the future” (Mordecai, 1940, p 4).
This quote is significant because it shows that the American Jewry, during the
Holocaust, wanted to remain disconnected both from the events as well as from the
European Jewish refugees escaping from these events to America. To emphasize the
need for assimilation that American Jews felt, the author states: “the great masses of
American Jews are indifferent to the fate of their people or the preservation of a
posterity” (Mordecai, 1940, p 4). Therefore, the American Jews, as has been
explained earlier, felt the need to assimilate into the American society. They did not
want to be looked at as “Jews, they wanted to be looked at as “Americans”. Thus,
these two primary sources from American newspaper articles published during the
Holocaust definitely underscore this fact. These two primary sources are very similar
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to Bolkosky’s finding in which he observed that one American Jewish leader actually
stated that “new settlements of Jews in the United States would not be encouraged
beyond the country’s ‘absorptive capacity’…new Jewish refugees must not displace
native Americans” (Bolkosky, 2000, p 310). Therefore, in making such a statement,
the American Jewish community was clearly distinguishing itself from the European
Jewry; they did not see themselves as “Jews” collectively; they were not “one
people”, but two different groups, the outsiders, which were the Jewish refugees, and
the assimilated, the American Jews.
Therefore, now it is important to ask the key and critical questions: how do
you go from being afraid of anti-Semitism, having no leadership, unity, or power, not
only in the case of organizations but also in the case of the American Jewish
community as a whole, and not being able to take action because the Jews in the U.S.
government were not very concerned or active in taking up the case of the European
Jewish refugees (“American Jewry and the Holocaust,” para 3) as has been previously
mentioned, to having a voice, power, confidence, and strength to influence US foreign
policy with Israel? What happened for this change to occur and how did the Israel
Lobby get to where it is now?
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Chapter 5: 1948- The Lobby Had Clark Clifford to Thank

“Nearly a decade after leaving office, Truman was asked…if he had
any regrets in extending recognition to the new state of Israel. He
replied: Not the slightest for this reason. I’m going to brag a little if
you’ll allow me. I know the history of that section of the world fairly
well. When it came time to make the decision and there was a chance to
create the State of Israel, as had been promised, I just carried out the
agreements that had already been made on the subject, and I’ve never
been sorry for it because I think it’s necessary that there be a State of
Israel” (Benson, 1997, p 54).
The aim of this chapter is to present the events leading up to Truman’s
recognition of the state of Israel in 1948. The chapter will do so by specifically
exploring a very important article written by Clack Clifford, who was present in the
U.S. government (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008) during the creation of the state.
From this first hand account, five major points regarding the inchoate lobby and its
influence can be discerned; the first three points relate to the American government:
1) the existence of anti-Israel sentiments within the U.S. government, 2) the fact that
George Marshall, who was the Secretary of State at the time (“Biographies of the
Secretaries of State,” n.d.), and Truman were not in agreement on the Israel issue, 3)
trusteeship and state recognition were both options on the table; as for the last two
points, they do not relate to the American government: 4) Clifford’s discussion of the
events leading up to Israel’s creation and 5) Clifford’s mention of the American
Zionists. These points are not just a summary of this critical article, they are also an
analysis of the events leading up to Truman’s decision to reject the State
Department’s recommendation, and accept the new state, and they enable us to
contextualize such a critical time period that is central to this thesis. The chapter will
also discuss the existence of the Israel Lobby, referred to as the Zionist Lobby at the
time, its role, and how Truman saw it. It is essential to note that the lobby discussed in
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this chapter appears in a different form from today’s Israel Lobby. One of the key
players during this time period was the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA),
which was established in the late 1800s, specifically “in 1897” (“What is the ZOA?”,
2016, para 1), and characterizes itself as “the oldest pro-Israel organization in the
United States” (“What is the ZOA?”, 2016, para 1). The ZOA is important because it
was the first attempt at a formal lobbying effort by supporters of a Jewish state, and
appears to be a “proto lobby”. The ZOA will be mentioned further towards the end of
this chapter.

A.

Resistance to Zionist Objectives in the American Government

The first point that is very clear in Clifford’s article is that the people around
Truman were not at all supportive of Zionist objectives. “From the beginning, I
[Clifford] had also supported the creation of the Jewish state, even though this put me
in opposition to an entire generation of senior foreign policy makers” (Clifford and
Holbrooke, 2008), including George Marshall, the Secretary of State (“Biographies of
the Secretaries of State,” n.d.). This statement is critical because it shows that Clifford
was actually swimming against the tide when he believed it was necessary to stand
with Israel, and that the common opinion was not to support this state at the point of
its establishment, and this was the main conflict within the White House. Clifford
goes on to say, “I knew Marshall and Lovett would argue that we should continue to
support trusteeship, and delay in recognizing the new state – but by ‘delay’ I was
convinced that State in fact meant ‘deny’ (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008),” which is
further support for the point regarding the U.S. government’s, specifically the State
Department’s, anti-Zionist stance. Finally, Clifford explains that “[his] fears about the
State Department had crystallized after a bitter incident in March, when, without
informing the President, it had permitted the American delegation to the UN to
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reverse its support for partition and switch to trusteeship for Palestine” (Clifford and
Holbrooke, 2008). Clifford explains that this change went directly against “a personal
commitment the President had given the previous day to Chaim Weizmann, the
Zionist leader who would later become the first President of Israel” (Clifford and
Holbrooke, 2008). When Truman found out what had happened at the UN, Clifford
states that he was upset, but at the same time he refrained from instructing Marshall
“to reendorse partition” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008) because he did not want to
create a problem with him (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008).
What is very interesting about the above statements is that they show that
Truman actually did want to recognize Israel, but almost everyone around him did not
want to do so; therefore, he did not know how to go about the process without the
support of the rest of the American government. Clifford describes the meeting that
took place at the White House only two days before the state of Israel was created.
Clifford was obviously being very pro-Israel, against everyone else, such as George
Marshall “and his deputy, Robert Lovett” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008); after he
had finished discussing his points, this was the reaction:
“Marshall, scarcely concealing his ire, shot back, ‘These considerations have
nothing to do with the issue. I fear that the only reason Clifford is here is that he is
pressing a political consideration with regard to this issue. I don’t think politics
should play any part in this’” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). Marshall’s quote leads
directly to the second point: Marshall was not on the same page with Truman, and
believed Truman was doing this, as in wanted to support Israel, for internal political
reasons; this means that they were simply accusing Truman of not caring for the
Zionist cause, and for having personal interests to accept this new state. Lovett took
the floor claiming that if the U.S. acknowledged Israel, “such a move would be
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injurious to the prestige of the President. It is obviously designed to win the Jewish
vote, but in my opinion, it would lose more votes than it would gain” (Clifford and
Holbrooke, 2008). Secretary of State Marshall strongly believed that the idea Clifford
was promoting of supporting Israel “was dictated by domestic political
considerations, specifically a quest for Jewish votes” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008).
Marshall then stated, “If you [Truman] follow Clifford’s advice and if I were to vote
in the election, I would vote against you” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). Marshall
had just menaced the President of the United States in order to get him not to
acknowledge the state that was on the verge of creation. This is the reason why the
meeting is referred to as the “ ‘White House Confrontation on Recognition’ on 12
May” (Fetter, 2008, p 503).
In his article, Clifford emphasizes that Marshall and Lovett were incorrect in
assuming that he wanted the U.S. to recognize the new state so that Truman could
attain more votes. Clifford underscores that
“since at the time [in 1948] a significant number of Jewish Americans
opposed Zionism, neither the President nor I believed that Palestine
was the key to the Jewish vote. As I had written in 1947, the key to the
Jewish vote in 1948 would not be the Palestine issue, but a continued
commitment to liberal political and economic policies” (Clifford and
Holbrooke, 2008).
Therefore, this quote is very significant because it shows the continued rift
discussed in the previous chapter between the American Jewish community, and
outside issues relevant to the rest of world Jewry.

B.

American Zionists in the Picture

The American Zionists during 1948 need to be examined in detail as it is
central to understanding the role they played as well as their existence as the
predecessors of the Israel Lobby. The best method to determine this role is by looking
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at primary sources from the time period. In an article published in The New York
Times in the first week of 1947, there are very critical statements that actually present
the American Zionists as united for one cause:

(“Zionists Here Hail Decisions at Basle,” 1947, p 13)
This section from the article clearly demonstrates that these groups were
collaborating together for a new state to be created, and were openly denouncing
anyone who seemed to be an obstacle to their goal. What can be understood from this
excerpt is that at the World Zionist Congress, those who attended were in line with
the idea of the creation of Israel and that the Zionist Organization of America brought
this stance to the U.S. during a demonstration.
Towards the end of January, in another article also published in The New York
Times, the author quotes “Dr. Emanuel Neumann, [who was the] vice president of the
Zionist Organizations of America” (Egan, 1947, p 8) as having stated “United States
Zionists are ready to pour ‘millions’ of dollars into the financing of ‘illegal’
immigration of Jews to Palestine” (Egan, 1947, p 8), underscoring that they had the
financial capacity to do so. In the same newspaper on the 17th of February 1947,
another article states the following:

Bahnassy, 59	
  

(Belair, 1947, p 14)

(Belair, 1947, p 14)
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The excerpt from the first article indicates how the American Zionists were
organizing and rallying for the cause of Palestine, and had not given up. However, the
second excerpt is even more significant because this idea of the “survival of Jewry”
(Belair, 1947, p 14) had not been existent in the previous chapter regarding the
Holocaust, nor was it tied to statehood either. Therefore, it represents a shift in
behavior, whereby the issue of Palestine was being discussed openly, and even
aggressively. Although the Zionists had taken up a more aggressive tone and activity
appears to be taking place, they still had no influence because as was seen in the
previous section, the American government was leaning towards trusteeship and not a
new state. In another article, also published in The New York Times, the author
presents voices of several leaders of American Jewish organizations. These leaders
are openly denouncing Britain and claiming that it is not doing enough to promote “a
Zionist State” (“American Zionists Denounce Bevin,” 1947, 4). Therefore, this
demonstrates the first example, since the Holocaust time period, in which we are able
to see groups that are openly voicing their opinions and pushing for a cause.
Then, by the first week of March in 1947, the Zionist Organization of America
(ZOA), passed “a resolution pledging ‘support of the maximum resources of
American Jewry’ for continuance of ‘the stream of Jewish immigration into Palestine
in defiance of the British blockade” (“Entry Aid Pledged by Zionists of U.S.,” 1947, p
2). In addition to this, “the Council [part of the ZOA] adopted a mobilization call to
increase membership in the Zionist Organization of America” (“Entry Aid Pledged by
Zionists of U.S.,” 1947, p 2), which underscores the American Zionists’ rallying and
activity. One year later on the 10th of May, 1948, only four days before the new Israeli
state was to be created, the Zionist Organization of America was still trying to gain
more members in what they referred to as “ ‘Liberation Week’…[which was taking

Bahnassy, 61	
  
place] in support of the Jewish state in Palestine” (“‘Liberation Week’ Begun by
Zionists,” 1948, p 16) that was on the brink of creation.

(“‘Liberation Week’ Begun by Zionists,” 1948, p 16)
The significance of the above quote is that it presents not only the
determination of the American Zionists to see Israel created, but also the method of
appealing to the American Jewish community in order to rally for this cause as well.
Thus, the excerpts from the presented articles show that as far back as 1947, meaning
one year before the state was created, these Zionists were fighting for the birth of
Israel to take place; they were attempting to become organized for this one cause. In
response to Israel finally becoming a state, Bertram Hulen published an article in The
New York Times on the 15th of May 1948 quoting Truman: “The United States
recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of
Israel” (Hulen, 1948, p 1). Thus, it is important to question if Truman’s decision was
in fact influenced by the Zionists’ activities, or by other factors.

C.

Trusteeship or State?

The previous section presented the American Zionists’ position with regard to
Israel. What were the American government’s possible decisions that it had laid out
on the table? This is the third major point regarding the issue of recognizing and
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accepting this Jewish state; there were two options that the U.S. could have chosen
between. Truman’s preferred course was recognition, which was at odds with
Marshall. According to Clifford: “with the May 14 deadline fast approaching, the
U.S. was in the awkward position of having its UN delegation still rounding up votes
for trusteeship while the President favored partition and prompt recognition of the
soon to be proclaimed Jewish state” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). The fact that
these American delegates were focusing on the subject of the trusteeship means that
Israel would not, and could not, be an independent state, while at the same time,
Truman and Clifford wanted to acknowledge the new state of Israel when it was
established. Logically speaking, a newly independent state could not be a trusteeship,
and these two very different objectives cannot be reconciled, and this can be seen
through Clifford’s re-telling of the incident:
“But one last, suitably bizarre scene was still to be played out. At 5:45
p.m. I [Clifford] called Dean Rusk to ask him to inform Ambassador
Warren Austin, the head of our UN delegation, that the White House
would announce recognition of Israel right after 6 p.m.. I realized as I
talked to Rusk that Lovett had not yet told him that the decision had
been made. He reacted as if he had been stung: ‘This cuts directly
across what our delegation had been trying to accomplish in the
General Assembly – and we have a large majority for it,’ he responded
testily” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008).
Therefore, not only was there a lack of communication in the White House, but
there was also a lack of unity because there were people working in different
directions with different aims. However, it must be noted that the final decision was
obviously made by the President; he was the one who held the authority in this
situation and this is also made clear in Clifford’s previous statement in which the
American ambassador to the UN was told which decision to follow through with from
above.
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D.

The Outcome

The fourth major point that must be mentioned is Clifford’s description of the
events of the establishment of “the new state” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). He
claims that he called the “Jewish Agency representative [Epstein]” (Clifford and
Holbrooke, 2008) himself and told him: “we would like you to send an official letter
to President Truman before twelve o’clock today formally requesting the United
States to recognize the new Jewish state. I would also request that you send a copy of
the letter directly to Secretary Marshall” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). Clifford’s
description of the events presents forth two very important facts: 1) he openly states
that Truman did not know how to act when the time came and the state was created,
in only a few hours (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008) and 2) the Jewish Agency did not
even know or have the capacity to write this letter, and it was Clifford who helped
them compose the message. Therefore, it was Clifford who had reached out to them,
informed them of the steps, and guided them through the process. This underscores
that there was no leadership or organization, and they had to rely on him for help.
However, even more importantly than this, they had no knowledge of the potential
“name of the new state” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008) was to be. This shows that it
was not only the American government that was underprepared, it was also the case
with the future government members of Israel; this presents forth obvious major
weaknesses which are considered a very dramatic shift when looking at Israel today.
Clifford includes part of the message that was to be sent to Truman as well as
Marshall:
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(Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008)
Clifford includes small, but very significant telling details. For example, he
notes that because Epstein had no knowledge of the potential name, he merely
denoted it as “the Jewish State” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). However, when the
message was on its way to delivery, Epstein finally “got word on his shortwave radio
that the new state would be called ‘Israel’ ” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). The
result was that, before the message could be delivered, “two blocks from the White
House, Zinder, sitting in the car Epstein had provided, crossed out with a pen the
words ‘Jewish State’ and inserted the word ‘Israel’ ” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008).
There was clearly no plan by the Jewish Agency, and matters were happening very
haphazardly. If the Jewish Agency had a prescribed plan, Epstein would not have
resorted to Clifford in the first place. On the contrary, he would have already
constructed the message and delivered it before Clifford would have asked him to do
so. More importantly, this man would have been aware of the name of this new state
that was only a few hours away from being established. There was absolutely no
direction by the Jewish Agency, and clearly no leadership as well. This point is
interesting because it enables us to draw parallels between the Jewish Agency as well
as the American Jewish Community mentioned in the previous chapter.
There is another telling incident that Clifford mentions that leads to the fifth and
final point, and that is the issue of the American Zionists. In response to Clifford

Bahnassy, 65	
  
going to Lovett and telling him that Truman had made up his mind, later that day this
happens:
“Around 4 p.m. [of the same day that Israel was to be created], Lovett
made the telephone call I had waited so long to receive: ‘Clark, I think
we have something we can work with. I have talked to the General
[Marshall]. He cannot support the President’s position, but he has
agreed that he will not oppose it” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008).
This quote is important for two reasons: first, to have a secretary of state who
was openly in complete rejection of a presidential decision would have weakened the
government. However, it still says nothing of the power of the American Zionists, if
anything, this entire story represents the weakness of the Jewish Agency. At the end
of this article, Clifford mentions the American Zionists only once when he states that
“President Truman was often annoyed by the tone and fierceness of the pressure
exerted on him by American Zionists” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). Therefore,
even before the creation of Israel, there were Americans, which are characterized as
Zionists by Clark Clifford in his article, who were fighting relentlessly for the sake of
this state to exist, and these are the same American Zionists that the previous primary
sources have discussed. Michael Benson names one central character in this story:
Abba Hillel Silver (Benson, 1997, p 96). “In May 1947… [Truman stated]: ‘We could
have settled this Palestine thing if U.S. politics had been kept out of it. Terror and
[Rabbi] Silver are the contributing causes of some, if not all, of our troubles’”
(Benson, 1997, p 96). Verifying this idea, Eddie Jacobson told Chaim Weizmann
“that one of the hardest things to combat outside the State Department and the British
Foreign Office, was the conduct of some American Zionists” (Benson, 1997, p 96).
Michael Cohen delves into more detail than Benson and states that the “Zionist Lobby
came into its own during the Truman presidency, in the diplomatic struggle that
preceded the establishment in May 1948 of the State of Israel” (Cohen, 1990, p 59).
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Cohen underscores that the main player at the time was the Zionist Organization of
America (ZOA) “and its proxies” (Cohen, 1990, p 59); however, he does not delve
into any further details about which organizations those were. Regardless of this fact,
he explains that the ZOA attempted to rally the “American Jewish community”
(Cohen, 1990, p 59) for the cause of Israel. Thus, one author talks about people taking
the lead, while another author underscores the existence of a “lobby” at the time.
What must be noted is that this Zionist Lobby definitely did not look like the Israel
Lobby of today. What does become clearer, however, is that these “Zionist leaders”
(Benson, 1997, p 95) were able to rally the people.
Truman claimed that he was not only facing “incessant Zionist lobbying efforts
aimed at Truman personally, the White House was deluged with letters, telegrams,
and phone calls from citizens throughout the United States…From 1947 to 1948,
Truman received 48,600 telegrams, 790, 575 cards, and 81,200 pieces of other
mail…In 1948, during one three-month period alone, Truman received 301,900
postcards” (Benson, 1997, p 93). Although Benson does not discuss who these
“citizens” (Benson, 1997, p 93) were, they were obviously sympathizers of the cause
for a Jewish state. In that same year, Truman openly discussed feeling confused,
because of the extent of the lobbying for the sake of Israel, with “the president of the
St. Louis Council of the American Jewish Congress” (Benson, 1997, p 95). He
claimed that he “appreciated the ‘emotional feelings’ of the Jewish people, he once
again deferred final judgment on the matter to the United Nations” (Benson, 1997, p
95). Therefore, we can say that there was no lobby that existed in the same way or
form as it does today, but that there were organizations, as well as individuals such as
the previously mentioned Silver, who fought aggressively (Benson, 1997, p 96) to
sway presidential thinking and attempt to rally support. This underscores that the
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decision change was more the result of efforts of a few individuals and not the
cohesion of the lobby of today. We can also see from Truman’s quote that, in contrast
to the Holocaust time period discussed in the previous chapter, many American Jews
were starting to speak up openly about their preferences and demands of government.
Interestingly, as active as these groups and individuals were, Truman emphasized
“that his Palestine policy would not be influenced by the Zionist lobby” (Cohen,
1990, p 67). From the literature, it must also be noted that generally, these Zionists
tended to focus on the executive, and by pushing the people to write so many letters
and express how they felt, they were also encouraging them to bombard the executive
as well in order to convince the president. One incident that underscores this further
occurred between Truman and a congressman who went to discuss the issue of
European Jewish refugees being allowed to move to Palestine (Benson, 1997, p 93).
Truman stated “that he was tired of having Jews and Irishmen and Poles and
Armenians come to him representing their own ethnic interests. He said he wanted to
hear requests from some ‘Americans’” (Benson, 1997, p 93).
1.

Concluding Remarks: Where was the Influence?

The events leading up to Israel’s recognition are very telling. Even before the
decision was to be made, as the primary sources have shown, the American Zionists
were working together for the cause of Israel and they were very active in
propagandizing as well as fighting for Israel’s cause; however, they were not doing so
as the fully functional lobby that we see today, but as a “proto lobby”, a predecessor
to the one that currently exists and this explains why their role was diminished in the
following years, as will be seen through chapter on the 1956 war. This means that as
the American Zionists were fighting for the cause of Israel, they seemed to be
ineffective because there were still anti-Zionist feelings within the American
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government. In addition to this, the secretary of state was directly against Truman,
and this shows that there was no broad consensus on the issue of the new state. More
importantly, it was Clark Clifford who took it upon himself to be the Jewish Agency’s
guide in order to help them create their state, underscoring the fact that they could not
do so themselves. Therefore, placing this within the context of lobby literature,
“access is central to stimulating agency” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803), and it is
the exact opposite of this statement that takes place with regard to the Jewish Agency
because it was Clifford who had decided to take them by the hand and help, not the
Zionist Lobby’s efforts. Thus, the Jewish Agency had not reached out to him. This
means that Clark Clifford appears as on of the most important factors, and not the
American Zionists. Another important factor that also needs to be recognized is the
Cold War politics since according to Clifford himself, he had advised Truman that
“such a move should be taken quickly, before the Soviet Union or any other nation
recognizes the Jewish state” (Clifford and Holbrooke, 2008). In the next four
chapters, we will see if this proto lobby evolved into a more organized entity, or was
diminished with time.
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Chapter 6: About The Israel Lobby and its EstablishmentHistory and Origins
	
  

The aim of this chapter is to provide background information about the Israel
Lobby. The chapter will mention a central figure in the lobby’s creation named Isaiah
Kenen and discuss why he is significant. Finally, the chapter will look at the
organizations that compose the lobby. Thus, this chapter is strictly informative.
According to Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, the Israel Lobby “is a
loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S.
foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 5). In
addition to this, they explain that what the Israel Lobby is doing is actually what
typical lobbies aim to do, and it is “not a cabal or conspiracy that “controls” (Walt and
Mearsheimer, 2007, p 5) U.S. foreign policy. It is simply a powerful interest group…”
(Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 5). Therefore, the Israel Lobby has a cause: to
support Israel, and it constantly fights for this cause in order to endorse it in American
policy. Even though there are different subdivisions and organizations in the lobby,
“they share the desire to promote a special relationship between the United States and
Israel” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 5).

A.

The Creation

When researching the origins of the Israel Lobby, it is clear that at the starting
point of the Holocaust there was no lobby at all; what is very noticeable is that there
were a number of different American Jewish organizations, but not more than this.
The degree of interconnectedness between these different organizations is also not
clear, and this is demonstrated through the example of Isaiah L. Kenen.
A main player that needs to be mentioned when discussing the Israel Lobby is
Isaiah Kenen. Although originally not an American citizen, he gained the U.S.
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citizenship and began conducting activities to support Israel (“U.S. Department of
Justice,” 2009). Originally, he was born in Canada, but he had been attached to the
cause because of his parents; he characterizes his “father… [as] a life-long Zionist”
(Kenen, 1981, p 4) and explains that his father had suffered for being a Jew at every
stage of his life:
“My father’s life story epitomized the tragic history of his generation.
He fled from Czarist pogroms; he was a prisoner of the Communists;
his settlement in Palestine was barred by Anglo-Arab policy and,
residing in Europe, he perished soon after Nazis conquered the
Warsaw ghetto” (Kenen, 1981, p 5).
Hence, hearing these stories must have fueled Kenen’s passion for the cause
since he explains that he started his activism as early as the age of 12 by establishing
“The Young Judea Club” (Kenen, 1981, p 5). In 1926, Kenen moved to the U.S. and
“became the City Hall reporter, political writer, and State House correspondent for
The Cleveland News” (Kenen, 1981, p 5). By 1941, Kenen states that he had “become
president of the Cleveland Zionist District” (Kenen, 1981, p 6). According to official
U.S. Department of Justice documents, Kenen was part of several different Jewish
organizations. Among these Jewish organizations, the most important are: “member”
(“U.S. Department of Justice,” 2009) of the Zionist Organization of America, and he
explicitly notes that “it was [for] many years since 1947” (“U.S. Department of
Justice,” 2009). Next, he became an “executive secretary” (“U.S. Department of
Justice,” 2009) at the American Jewish Conference “from…1943…to 1948” (“U.S.
Department of Justice,” 2009), at the same time between 1947 and 1948 he was the
“New York Information Director” (“U.S. Department of Justice,” 2009) at the Jewish
Agency for Palestine. Therefore, he was clearly very active in numerous American
Jewish organizations, and often at the same time. At the time the document was
written, he states that he is
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“Now Director of Information for the Government of Israel’s mission to
the United Nations, previously having served as Director of
Information for the Jewish Agency for Palestine at the United Nations. I
am assuming direction of the Israel Government’s office of Information
of New York” (“U.S. Department of Justice,” 2009).
Therefore, Kenen’s job mentioned in the previous excerpt shows that he was to
promote Israeli interests in American policies, and he was being paid by Israel to do
so in the case of being a member for their mission at the U.N. (“FBI files,” 2008).
The position that Kenen next took is what paved the way from the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Kenen had become the “Washington
representative and registered lobbyist of the American Zionist Council (AZC)…”
(Schoolman, 1997) in 1951, and had therefore broken away from the government of
Israel (Smith, 2007, para 2). AZC’s focus was to promote Israel’s interests of
“financial…[and] military… aid” (Schoolman, 1997) as well as American policy
modifications that center on Israel (Schoolman, 1997). In 1954, the AZC transformed
“into a separate entity…: the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs
(AZCPA)” (Schoolman, 1997). This organization was then renamed into the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee in 1959 (Schoolman, 1997). Thus, Kenen
is referred to as the “founder” (“Isaiah L Kenen, 2016, para 6) of AIPAC. Kenen
explains that:
"The lobby for Israel, known as the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) since 1959, came into existence in 1951. It was
established at that time because Israel needed American economic
assistance to enable her to absorb the huge influx of refugees who
poured into the country soon after statehood." (“Isaiah L Kenen, 2016,
para 6).
In the chapter concerning his autobiography, he states that, altogether, his
different positions “equipped me [Kenen] for my Washington service: the struggle to
close a dark chapter in Jewish history and to turn a page illuminated by redemption
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and regeneration” (Kenen, 1981, p 6). Thus, his devotion to this cause seems to have
been due to very personal reasons; his act of participating in pro-Israel activities was
in no way coincidental or random. From what can be understood from his
autobiographical chapter, he grew up not only hearing of his father’s struggle, but
also watching him simply be “a life-long Zionist” (Kenen, 1981, p 5).
1.

Members

As the previously mentioned excerpt by Kenen concerning the Israel Lobby
reveals, he only mentions AIPAC, his own organization, when he speaks of the lobby.
However, there are currently numerous other organizations that fall under the
umbrella of the lobby. Alison Weir, from the Council for the National Interest (Weir,
2014), has provided the name of 55 organizations that are considered to be part of the
Israel Lobby, while claiming that this is only “a partial list” (Weir, 2014). Among the
most well-known organizations that Weir mentions are:, the first on the list being the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) which Weir characterizes as “the
most prominent governmental lobbying organization on behalf of Israel” (Weir,
2014), The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP),
The Emergency Committee for Israel (ECI), and the American Israel Education
Foundation (AIEF) (Weir, 2014). In addition to this, Weir also mentions the
American Jewish Committee (AJC), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), and
The Jewish Agency, which are the American Jewish organizations that were
mentioned in the previous section that had operated during the Holocaust. Thus, they
have clearly become part of the Israel Lobby.
Therefore, the third chapter on Iraq underscores the existence of a strong Israel
Lobby today. The fourth chapter on the Holocaust presents the idea that these
American Jewish organizations existed separately during the Holocaust and

Bahnassy, 73	
  
attempted, with difficultly and disunity, to help the European Jews; however, there
was no “Israel Lobby” at the time, obviously because the state itself did not exist, and
even more so, the American Jewish community was very much uninvolved. The fifth
chapter on 1948 underscored the idea of an inchoate, “proto” lobby that rallied for the
cause of a state, but disappeared after the goal had been achieved. Now, on the
contrary, we see that the Israel Lobby contains more than 55 organizations. According
to Cheryl Rubenberg, this shift became evident “in the years after 1967” (Rubenberg,
1986, p 15), whereby “the objective power of the pro-Israeli groups grew… [after
1967]… and assured Israel that its interests became American policy” (Rubenberg,
1986, p 15); Walt and Mearsheimer are also in support of this statement, explaining
that “the lobby’s size, wealth, and influence” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 118)
expanded drastically following the dramatic war of 1967 (Walt and Mearsheimer,
2007, p 118).
Thus, as can now be fully understood, the Israel Lobby exists to propagate and
push forward Israel’s interests. According to Mitchell Bard, the Israel Lobby
“consists of at least seventy-five different organizations, which in one way or another
support Israel” (Bard, 2012, para 30). The Israel Lobby, specifically AIPAC, is
viewed to be very effectual in achieving its goals. For example, one congressman
characterized AIPAC by stating that it was “without question the most effective lobby
in Congress” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 117). Another extremely critical quote
states that “it is argued in respect of the influence of pro-Israel Lobby that – if the proIsrael Lobby were to sponsor a resolution on Capitol Hill calling for the abolition of
the Ten Commandments, both Houses of Congress would adopt it overwhelmingly’”
(Milton-Edwards, 2009, p 171). However, this was obviously not always the case, as
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the last two chapters have shown. The following chapter seeks to explore how this
change took place, and the way in which the evolution occurred.

Chapter 7: 1956 War- The Seemingly Weak, and Almost
Invisible, Lobby
In this chapter, we will observe the role of the Israel Lobby during the 1956
war. The chapter aims to show that the lobby had played an extremely minimal part,
specifically since it could not get the American president to change his stance with
regard to Israel because he obligated it to return to Egypt the land it had taken over
due to the war. This underscores that the Israel Lobby represented no form of pressure
to the president, denoting no strength on its part. Therefore, the lobby appears to have
been largely ineffective in this particular situation.

A.

Leading Up to the War

Egypt went to the World Bank where both Britain and the United States both
agreed to help the country through an “approved…loan package” (Cleveland and
Bunton, 2009, p 310) towards the end of 1955. However, to move forward with the
“loan package” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 310) Britain and the U.S. had specific
“conditions” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 310) for Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser did
not accept these specific “conditions” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 310) instantly;
on the contrary, he thought it best to think about “whether or not to accept the
arrangement” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 310). Britain and the U.S. did not wait
for an answer; they cancelled the entire plan. As a direct reaction to this, “on July 26,
1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 311).
Nasser explained to the people that the money from the Suez Canal would be utilized
to build the dam (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 311).
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Therefore, the 1956 war occurred when Britain, France, and Israel attacked
Egypt. The war started “on October 29, 1956, with an Israeli strike into Sinai”
(Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 312). Interestingly, the war ended on “November 6th”
(Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 312) after both “Britain and France [had] agreed to a
UN-sponsored cease-fire” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 312); this left only Israel
occupying Egyptian territory. Thus, the dialogue that took place in the American
government after the war had ended revolved around the issue of Israel. The issue in
1956 was that the U.S. could either support Israel and support its decision of
continuing to occupy Egypt’s territory, or it could be directly opposed to Israel’s
occupation and order its withdrawal.

B.

The Israel Lobby’s Stance

Isaiah Kenen, mentioned in the previous chapter, stated that during the Suez war,
“We were dismayed by our government’s stand [of being pro-Arab]. We
joined the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
in appeals to the Administration to work for a negotiated settlement and
guarantees for agreed boundaries” (Kenen, 1981, p 132).
According to Weir, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations is in fact currently a member of the Israel Lobby (Weir, 2014). The
Conference of Presidents was established in 1951 in order to embody the American
Jewry’s opinions on matters concerning Israel (“Encyclopedia Judaica,” 2008, para
1). However, by “1966, the Conference became a body of constituent organizations,
rather than of presidents of organizations” (“Encyclopedia Judaica,” 2008, para 6).
The role of the Conference is to be a voice of the American Jewry’s needs, beliefs,
and wants, and although it does not aim to shift “strategy on public-policy issues
facing Israel” (“Encyclopedia Judaica,” 2008, para 8), it still does attempt to voice
Israel’s opinion to the U.S. government (“Encyclopedia Judaica,” 2008, para 8). The
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Conference’s website currently provides the names of 55 organizations that fall under
its umbrella (“Member Organizations, 2014), and several of them are also members of
the Israel Lobby, such as AIPAC (Weir, 2014). Therefore, the significance of this
mass-organization at this point in history is that it demonstrates the first stages, after
1948, where American Jewish organizations were attempting to mobilize under the
umbrella of an actual entity: the Conference of Presidents.
What could be understood from Isaiah Kenen’s previous statement is that he
did not agree with the U.S. government’s position towards Egypt, and that the existent
American Jewish organizations at the time had tried to take action with regard to the
issue. In addition to this, Kenen underscores that “we had strong public support”
(Kenen, 1981, p 132), whereby he attempts to indicate that the American public did
not agree with the government’s position of taking Egypt’s side.
What is very interesting about the role of the American Jewish community,
described by Kenen, is that it is extremely different from the way in which they act in
the contemporary time period. For example, he states,
“Meanwhile, there were long and feverish negotiations between the Israelis
and Dulles, and the Secretary of State tried to divide American Jews, most of
whom were strongly backing the Israelis. He invited a group of major Jewish
philanthropists, including leading non-Zionists, to use their influence to
persuade Israel to accept the U.S. position, but they held fast and refused to
qualify their support” (Kenen, 1981, p 134).
On the issue of Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory, according to
Findley, the Israel lobby was able to gain “support from Eleanor Roosevelt, former
President Truman, and leaders of both parties in the Senate, Democrat Lyndon
Johnson…and Republican William Knowland” (Findley, 1985, 119). The tactic the
Lobby followed in this case was to gain support from famous individuals who were
influential in the American political scene. In addition to this, according to one
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source, the proposed sanctions by Eisenhower caused him to be “thwarted by the proIsrael lobby in Congress” (Bastaki, 2014, para 6).
To add to that, the “Democratic Policy Committee” (Kenen, 1981, p 134) tried
to convince Eisenhower to refuse “any proposal to punish Israel for her rejection of
unconditional withdrawal” (Kenen, 1981, p 135). The conclusion of this meeting was
that the “Democratic Policy Committee” (Kenen, 1981, p 134) asked Eisenhower to
take “his case to the public” (Kenen, 1981, p 135) even though “the congressional
leaders declined to support Eisenhower’s position” (Rubenberg, 1986, p 81). When
Eisenhower did so, he did not mention the sanctions; however, “he did call for
pressure to force Israel’s withdrawal” (Kenen, 1981, p 135). In response to
Eisenhower’s speech, Kenen states that “20,000 people poured into Madison Square
Garden in a demonstration of protest” (Kenen, 1981, p 135). Kenen, who at the time
was working at the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), which
is AIPAC’s predecessor (Schoolman, 1997), appears to have organized, or been
linked to, this protest because he states that “we had asked Senator Douglas and
Bishop James to speak” (Kenen, 1981, p 135).
Finally at the end of his chapter, in a very disappointed tone, Kenen explains
that the press had shifted its position. At the beginning of the conflict, it was very
openly pro-Israel. However, in time, it started to criticize Israel and its actions. For
example, “The New York Times, on February 22, called on Israel to ‘put itself on the
side of the angels and set itself aright with both the U.N. and the great body of world
opinion” (Kenen, 1981, p 136). This point underscores that Israel was losing its
support, and that the Israel Lobby was not doing enough to rally the media for the
cause.
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C.

U.S. Government’s Stance

The U.S. government was inclined to take Egypt’s side rather than Israel’s. It
wanted Israel to return Egyptian territory. According to Kenen, “Instead of blaming
Egypt for the war, the Administration joined the Soviets in competition for Arab favor
– an unprincipled exercise in appeasement” (Kenen, 1981, p 132)
“In response to the Israeli invasion, the administration immediately
brought the matter before the Security Council. On October 30 the
American Ambassador to the United Nations…asked the council to find
a breach of the people, to order a cease-fire, and to instruct the Israeli
forces to withdraw behind the frontiers as established in the armistice
agreements” (Rubenberg, 1986, p 69).
The previous quote presents the U.S. government as prepared to place pressure
on Israel. During the Suez Crisis, Dulles appears to have attempted to use the
American Jewry in order to affect Israel’s actions; he wanted the American Jewish
organizations, in theory, to act as the mediators in order to have Israel change its
position into one that was more in line with the U.S. Kenen also underscores that both
Democrats and Republicans in congress were united against Dulles and Eisenhower
(Kenen, 1981, p 134). He also speaks of the “American Jewish Committee’s
Washington representative” (Kenen, 1981, p 134) as well as other members of the
American Jewish community (Kenen, 1981, p 135) who attempted to contact Lyndon
Johnson, “the Democratic leader” (Kenen, 1981, p 134) at the time in order to prevent
the U.S. government from sanctioning Israel (Kenen, 1981, p 135). “Other senators
joined their party leaders” (Kenen, 1981, p 135) to prevent the sanctions against Israel
as well. These events underscore that, in this case, the decision came from the
executive; it was the US president who had the authority to take action since all efforts
were targeted at him in order to change his mind.
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D.

The Outcome

The major relevant point in the Suez crisis is the fact that neither the American
Jewish organizations, nor Israel, could change the U.S. government’s stance; “under
continuing pressure to withdraw, Israel finally gave her reluctant consent” (Kenen,
1981, p 136). This point is important for numerous reasons: primarily, it underscores
that the American Jewish community was not powerful enough to influence the
government’s decision. Secondly, it leads to the question of: where was the Israel
Lobby? The Conference of Presidents as well as the American Jewish Committee are
both mentioned in Kenen’s chapter on the 1956 war; however, he does not mention
the lobby as a whole standing united and attempting to pressure the U.S. government.
In fact, what is very ironic is the fact that he mentions the American Jewish
community actually being used as a tool to get Israel to concede. This is the reason
why Dulles’ statement about the American Jewish Community is ironic since he
states: “I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to carry out a foreign
policy [in the Middle East] not approved by the Jews” (Neff, 1996, para 5). This is
also the reason why it is very odd that Neff mentions that the “lawmakers” (Neff,
1996, para 5) around Eisenhower feared “the influence of the Israeli lobby” (Neff,
1996, para 5). These two statements by Dulles and Neff are in direct contradiction of
what actually happened. Adam Garfinkle supports this point by explaining that “U.S.
policy had forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai after the 1956 Suez War, a matter
over which the pro-Israel lobby was completely powerless. It is not clear at all what
Dulles was talking about” (Garfinkle, 2009, p 207). This is actually the reason why
Michael Hoffman states that Eisenhower’s greatest moment in history “was the Suez
Canal crisis, when he faced down Britain, the Israelis and their lobby in the U.S.”
(Hoffman, 2011, para 4). It is also worth noting that Rubenberg’s chapter dedicated to
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the 1956 war and the tension between the U.S. and Israel does not mention the Israel
Lobby once. If the Lobby had played an important part, this part would have been
acknowledged.
1.

No Sign of Strong Influence

Before the Suez War had actually taken place, Paul Findley explains that
Israel, Britain, and France had already decided on their plan to “attack…Egypt”
(Findley, 1985, p 118). Interestingly, this happened at a very critical point because it
came hand in hand with Eisenhower’s “re-election” (Findley, 1985, p 118). Therefore,
in Israel’s mind, this would prevent Eisenhower from trying to get involved in the
issue; “with the U.S. presidential election just days away, [Israel] counted on partisan
pressures from its American lobby to keep candidate Eisenhower on the sidelines. All
miscalculated” (Findley, 1985, p 118). This statement shows that the Israel Lobby had
not devised and used its tactics correctly, or even processed the issue clearly; they had
not only misunderstood, but also underestimated Eisenhower. What is even more
ironic than this is the fact that “more American Jews voted for Eisenhower in 1956
(40 percent) than those who had supported him in 1952 (36 percent)” (Findley, 1985,
p 118). This shows that the American Jews had actually voted against the Israel
Lobby’s efforts, underscoring that the Israel Lobby was not powerful enough to have
influenced the election result. This example is in direct contrast of the previously
discussed Iraq case presented earlier in which the American Jewish community was
not siding with the lobby, but the lobby’s preference still prevailed. Therefore, this
shows that there was no influence by the Israel Lobby during 1956.
The case of the 1956 war reveals that the Israel Lobby had no influence or
capacity to change Eisenhower’s decision, and although they appear to have played a
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minimal role, it is still essential to discuss their methods with regard to lobbying
techniques. The purpose of this will be to present the stark contrast in their influence
as they start to gain more power in the American political scene during future
conflicts.
2.

Lobbying Techniques

It is essential to discuss the methods used by members of the Israel Lobby to
attempt to change the U.S. government’s stance. Those lobbying for the cause, in this
cause it is the Israel Lobby, expect the following reaction from its supporters: “the
ideal response they seek is not simply ‘I’ll support you on this’ but ‘what can I do to
help?’ ” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803). Therefore, when Findley states that the
Israel lobby had gained “support from Eleanor Roosevelt, former President Truman,
and leaders of both parties in the Senate, Democrat Lyndon Johnson…and Republican
William Knowland” (Findley, 1985, 119) this shows that these individuals of
influence were “sympathetic” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803) to the Israel Lobby’s
cause and had decided “to help” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803) by openly voicing
their opinions, ones which were considered very weighted in American politics, in
order to affect the president’s decision. According to Hojnacki and Kimball,
“legislators have the upper hand in relationships with interest groups… granting
access primarily to people who share their predispositions and to groups with whom
they have established relationships” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 776) and this
directly applies to Johnson and Knowland openly supporting the Israel Lobby since
they were both “leaders of… [their] parties” (Findley, 1985, 119). The method used
by the Israel Lobby in this case is also discussed by Cumberlege, whereby they were
clearly using their “connections” (Cumberlege, 2004, p.30); this is also mentioned by
Janice Terry since she states that lobbying for a specific cause may be enhanced by “a
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close personal relationship with just one powerful senator or representative” (Terry,
2005, p 30). Regardless of all of these attempts, Eisenhower was still able to stand by
his decision and follow through with it.
As for the large protest that Isaiah Kenen discusses in his chapter, this method
is in line with the point that Grossman and Helpman discuss. Grossman and Helpman
explain that “sometimes they [interest groups] undertake disruptive activities, which
are intended to coerce rather than persuade” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1). In
this case, however, they neither “coerced” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1) nor
“persuaded” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1) Eisenhower to change his stance.
Therefore, the reason why the Suez Crisis is critical to discuss is because it shows that
even with these commonly used lobbying techniques, the Israel Lobby was unable to
affect Eisenhower’s decision. This example demonstrates the weakness of the Israel
Lobby, and their ineffectiveness to change Eisenhower’s policy. Hence, in accordance
to Hojnacki and Kimball’s, who “define lobbying as providing information directly to
members of Congress…to further the two goals described above: [to influence bills
and legislation]. We believe that this definition characterizes what groups do and what
they hope to achieve by applying their resources to advocacy” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 778), underscoring that they had not successfully reached their goal when
they had “advocated” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 778) for their cause. The
historical examples that will follow demonstrate a rise in the Israel Lobby’s power;
the evolution will become very clear as time passes.
In conclusion, even a few months after the conflict had ended, “Eisenhower
wrote of the American position after January 13: ‘if Israel did not desire to defy the
United Nations it was first necessary that her forces withdraw unconditionally behind
the borders fixed by the truce of 1948. Only then could the nation expect the support
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of the rest of the free world in securing by peaceful means her legal rights”
(Rubenberg, 1986, p 75). The fact that Eisenhower continued to be adamant and
unmoved about his position reveals that the Israel Lobby neither represented a threat,
nor had influence to impact or change his decision.

Chapter 8: 1967- The Six-Day-War
This chapter aims to show that, as with the case of the 1956 war, the Israel
Lobby was also generally inactive, with some exceptions, during the 1967 war.
However, it is only after the 1967 war that we see an obvious change in the American
Jewish community’s behavior, and more activity within the Israel Lobby. Thus, it is
Israel’s winning of the 1967 war that strengthened its relationship with the U.S., and
not the Israel Lobby itself; the 1967 war was a defining moment for both the Israel
Lobby and the American Jewish Community because it gave birth to a clear new
attitude, one that brought them to become more active. Therefore, this new identity
was reactionary to the war.

A.

Background	
  to	
  the	
  war	
  

	
  
“In May 1967 Soviet and Syrian intelligence reported that Israel was preparing
a large-scale military operation against Syria for its sponsorship of Palestinian
guerrilla activities” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 338), and although this
information was wrong, Nasser decided to take action. The first step he took was by
sending Egyptian “troops” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 338) to Sinai. Next,
Nasser asked “all UN forces be withdrawn from Sinai” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009,
p 338). These UN troops were considered to be a buffer zone amid the two hostile
states (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 338). The final move Nasser made was
“reoccupying the UN positions at Sharm al-Shaykh and announcing a blockade on
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Israeli shipping passing though the Straits of Tiran” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p
38).
In Israel’s eyes, what Nasser had done was “a casus belli” (Quandt, 1977, p
41), which translates into an act of war. In an article published one week after the war
had taken place, the author relays the fear that Israelis had felt: “Levi Eshkol [Israeli
Prime Minister] and his people found themselves besieged and threatened as few
nations have ever been in their history” (Dunetz. 2011, para 1).
Israel responded to Nasser’s move by conducting war which took place on
“:June 5, 1967” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 338). Israel was able to “destroy
most of the Egyptian air force while it was still on the ground. Later that same day,
after Syria and Jordan had entered the conflict, Israeli pilots effectively destroyed the
air forces of those countries as well” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 338). The war
with Egypt ended four days later as a result of “a cease-fire” (Cleveland and Bunton,
2009, p 339). The result of the war was a crushing loss for the Arab countries that had
participated; Israel had now gained an overwhelming amount of land: “East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the Golan Heights” (Cleveland and
Bunton, 2009, p 338). Egypt had instigated a war it could not win, and Jordan and
Syria, attempting to help, had also lost significantly. By “November…1967”
(Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 342) the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 242 (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 342) whereby Israel was to return the
land it had taken during the war (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 342). However, this
resolution was not successful because not all of the parties to the conflict agreed with
it (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p 342).
Walt and Mearsheimer underscore that “since the Six-Day War of 1967, a
salient feature- and arguably the central focus- of America’s Middle East policy has
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been its relationship with Israel” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 7). They also
explain that The U.S.-Israeli relations were strengthened from “1967 to 1989” (Walt
and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 51) for one very obvious reason: the Soviet Union. Israel
had crushed the Soviet Union’s allies in two wars during that time period which
“enhanced U.S. prestige” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 52). The issue in 1967,
with the case of the war, the U.S. had two choices: it could either support the state of
Israel, or act as it had done in the previous conflict and side with the opposing state.

A.

Change: U.S. Government Sides with Israel

After Nasser had sent his military to Sinai, Israel wrote to the U.S. president
Lyndon Johnson and asked him to “reaffirm its commitment to Israeli security and
inform the Soviet Union in particular of this commitment” (Quandt, 1977, p 40).
Unlike in the previous conflict in which the U.S. had openly denounced Israeli actions
and forced it to leave Egyptian territory, the U.S. followed Israel’s instructions and
conveyed the message to the Soviet Union (Quandt, 1977, p 40), but also went further
by “suggesting…a ‘joint initiative of the two powers to prevent the dispute between
Israel and the U.A.R. and Syria from drifting into war” (Quandt, 1977, p 40 - 41),
underscoring that the U.S. was inclined to support Israel during this conflict.
What is interesting to note is that Johnson seemed hesitant throughout this
particular situation. On the 18th of May when Nasser had requested complete
“UNEF…withdrawal” (Quandt, 1977, p 41), Johnson did not react, even though he
had promised Israel he was on its side. When Johnson finally decided to take action
by delivering a message to Nasser asking him to avoid incidents “that might lead to
war” (Quandt, 1977, p 42) it was too late because Nasser “had already…closed”
(Quandt, 1977, p 42) the Straits of Tiran. Therefore, in this specific crisis, we are able
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to see that the U.S. sides more with Israel than it did in 1956, but at the same time we
can also see very obvious hesitation on its part as well.
However, according to William Quandt, America’s hesitation is discontinued after the
war begins. He states:
“Why was Johnson prepared to support Israel so strongly once the war
had begun, especially in view of his firm expression, before June 5, of
his opposition to war? Was he responding to pressures from pro-Israeli
opinion in the United States, or to his own sympathy for the Jewish
state?” (Quandt, 1977, p 60)

B.

The Lobby: Not in Sight

The previous quote by William Quandt is extremely significant because it leads
to specific and central questions: what was the role of the lobby in this conflict? Is the
Israel Lobby what caused Johnson to strengthen his stance and stand by Israel more
firmly? According to Quandt, during this time period, “the…pro-Israel interest
groups” (Quandt, 1977, p 70) did exist, and he characterizes them as “allegedly
powerful” (Quandt, 1977, p 70). However, he states that their role was that of
“unimportance during the crisis” (Quandt, 1977, p 70). He further explains that
“lobbying…was not a significant factor” (Quandt, 1977, p 70) because Lyndon
Johnson was “already” (Quandt, 1977, p 70) very much pro-Israel, and he had not
focused any of his attention on “the pro-Israel lobby during the prewar crisis”
(Quandt, 1977, p 70). These statements clearly show that the lobby existed as an
entity at the time, much different from the Holocaust time-period, but had no major
role because the U.S. president’s initial stance was to side with Israel.
Although Tom Segev does not mention the lobby in specific, he does explain
that the Israeli government did play a part in rallying the American population as the
conflict took place by “create[ing] a public atmosphere that will constitute pressure on
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the [Johnson] administration…” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 121). This happened
through “ ‘getting sympathetic Americans to write letters, editorials, telegrams, and
public statements’…whose purpose…was ‘to create a public atmosphere…that will
strengthen our friends within the administration’ ” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p
122). Therefore, “the White House” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 122) had been
bombarded “with letters” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 122) asking Johnson to
remain by Israel’s side (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 122). This method used by
the people is similar to the previously mentioned protest by Isaiah Kenen which
occurred in 1956; in this case, however, the people were voicing their opinion by
openly writing to the president, as well as writing about the issue. In lobby literature,
as mentioned earlier, “[interest groups] undertake disruptive activities, which are
intended to coerce rather than persuade” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1) and
they can also involve the people as an attempt “to win voter sympathy” (Grossman
and Helpman, 1994, p 1), and this is one such example. Although the method of
writing letter to the American government, as well as “public statements” (Walt and
Mearsheimer, 2007, p 122) is not exactly “disruptive” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994,
p 1), its aim was still to place pressure on the government.

C.

The Outcome

Quandt explains that what enabled “Johnson to maintain a policy of support
for Israel” (Quandt, 1977, p 70) was “the extremely pro-Israeli tone of American
public opinion, coupled with Nasser’s hostility” (Quandt, 1977, p 70), but it was not
the Israel Lobby (Quandt, 1977, p 70). An example that directly reinforces Quandt’s
analysis is that of the “rally” (“A Near-Riot Erupts at Rally for Israel,” 1967, p 9) that
took place on the second day of the 1967 war, which was discussed in an article
published in The New York Times. The article states that this event was “sponsored by
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the New York City Labor Council” (“A Near-Riot Erupts at Rally for Israel,” 1967, p
9), underscoring that it was not the Israel Lobby that had organized it, but at the same
time showing that there were pro-Israel feelings in the American society.
1.

Where was the influence?

The fact that the Israel Lobby does not appear to have been a major player
during the conflict underscores that Johnson’s decision was not influenced by it. On
the contrary, like in 1948, members of his administration were instrumental in
shaping U.S. response, and the perfect example of this is Eugene Rostow as well as
his brother. “The Rostow brothers were also firmly pro-Israel. Both were in positions
of considerable influence at the White House. Eugene Rostow was Under Secretary of
State in June 1967 and his brother, Walt, was National Security Adviser” (Mutawi,
2002, p 99). Thus, again we are able to see that government officials in high positions
as having the influence, rather than the lobby itself. Eugene Rostow himself was
active in the composition of Resolution 242 (“Resolution 242,” 2007). In addition to
this, the Israeli government’s interference to rally the American population for its
cause also underscores that the lobby appears to have been inactive; if the lobby was
actively participating, there would not have been a need for the Israeli government to
interfere.
In the case of Johnson, it is because he was originally pro-Israel (Quandt,
1977, p 70) that he openly sided with the state. In addition to this, the general
American population appears to have supported Israel (Quandt, 1977, p 70), enabling
Johnson, the key character with authority in this situation, to make the decision to
take Israel’s side and “maintain a policy of support” (Quandt, 1977, p 70). Therefore,
we can make the conclusion that the lobby’s role was again minimal in this particular
conflict as well.
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2.

Impact of the War: Post-War Power

J.J. Goldberg mentions the rise in power of the lobby. He explains that the Six Day
War resulted in the:
“prominence [of] a group of ‘New Jews’ drawn disproportionately
from hard-line Zionist, Orthodox, and neoconservatives circles. ‘Their
defiance was so strident, and their anger so intense […] that the rest of
the Jewish community respectfully stood back and let the New Jews take
the lead. The minority was permitted to speak for the mass and become
the dominant voice of Jewish politics” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p
126).
Similar to this previous statements, Stuart Eizenstat explains that the Israel Lobby’s
rise in power became extremely obvious in “the mid-1960s” (Eizenstat ,1991, p 92).
He further explains that:
“two events sparked this new political consciousness. First, the
dramatic Six-Day War in 1967 galvanized the American Jewish public
like no event since Israel’s War of Independence. In less than a week,
Israel’s remarkable victory over the military forces of Egypt, Jordan,
Syria, and the Iraqi air force wiped away centuries-old Jewish
selfimage as helpless supplicants unable to fight their oppressors. The
sense of pride in “new Jews,” proud, strong, and capable of defending
themselves, had an incalculable effect on American Jewry” (Eizenstat
,1991, p 92).
What is very critical about this statement is that it highlights that even though
the Israel Lobby was existent in “the mid-1960s” (Eizenstat ,1991, p 92), its
dominance became extremely obvious after the 1967 Six-Day War had taken place,
and not during the actual event of the war. As has been consistent with the general
literature, the shift “in U.S.-Israeli relations” (Verbeeten, 2006) took place following
the Six-Day War, and according to Verbeeten, ironically, “it was the Israeli military
that achieved what AIPAC had not: a general acceptance among U.S. policymakers
that close relations with Israel was an asset to U.S. national security and regional
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interests” (Verbeeten, 2006) because they had won the 1967 war as well as stood by
the Jordanians “during and after the 1970 Black September crisis” (Verbeeten, 2006).
Collectively, from the four previous statements that discuss the change in
American Jewry as well as shift in American-Israeli “relations” (Verbeeten, 2006)
due to the 1967 war, a very sharp contrast can be seen between the American Jewish
community during the Holocaust, in which they preferred to remain disconnected and
uninvolved with the European Jews, while during and after the 1967 war the
American Jewish Community’s attitude had differed completely and taken an
opposite turn. According to Jack Wertheimer, “American Jews” (Wertheimer, 1995, p
32) took action by organizing “mass” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 32) protests at “the
United Nations, in Washington, and in local communities” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 32).
Wertheimer characterizes this movement as “a new style, drawn from the
confrontational politics of the 1960s, converted thousands of Jews- particularly young
people- into activists fighting to ensure the survival of Jews abroad” (Wertheimer,
1995, p 32). These protests are the second example, after sending letters to the
president, of “[interest groups] acting out through disruptive activities, which are
intended to coerce rather than persuade” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p 1), which
have been mentioned previously. Lowery agrees with this and states that “public
opinion” (Lowery, 2007, p 44) actually provides significant weight when lobbying
(Lowery, 2007, p 44).
How is this point relevant to the Israel Lobby? Primarily, it can now be
understood that American Jewish organizations had failed the European Jewry during
the Holocaust, as did the American Jewry since they had chosen to stay disconnected.
By 1948, the inchoate lobby had fought for the cause of a state, but its momentum had
decreased as has been seen through the 1956 war. However, in the 1960s, we see a
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shift in attitude in both American Jewry as well as the Israel Lobby whereby they
have both started to mobilize. According to Wertheimer, the 1967 War led to “the
organized Jewish community…[to undergo] profound changes. For one thing,
American Jewry fully identified with Israel, an identification that galvanized the
community to unprecedented amounts of philanthropic giving and volunteering”
(Wertheimer, 1995, p 32). In an article published in The New York Times towards the
end of the 1967 war, the reporter captures the sense of surprise among members of the
United Jewish Appeal by the amount of money the American Jewish community was
giving away to Israel. “At a luncheon meeting…after word had arrived of the start of
hostilities, about 200 community leaders in the course of 15 minutes pledged $15million to the newly announced Israel Emergency Fund” (Fowle, 1967, p 10). The
article goes on to state, that in comparison to such previous events, this “would mean
a doubling or tripling of the normal annual contributions reaching Israel from
American Jews” (Fowle, 1967, p 10). Hence, this specific example underscores, not
only money, but the ability of the American Jewish community at the time to gather
such money for Israel. Therefore, in reference to Hojnacki and Kimball, in this case,
this massive amount of money is regarded as the “resource” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 776) that will eventually provide this community with the “access” (Hojnacki
and Kimball, 1998, p 776). After this step, “agency” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803)
becomes apparent, and this will be seen more clearly in the next chapter regarding the
1973 war.
Even religious figures sided with this idea that a change in the American Jewry
had taken place as a result of 1967. For example, in Rabbi Abraham Besdin’s sermon,
he states: “it took the shock of the Holocaust to remind many Jews of their identity. It
was the terror of a possible second Auschwitz in the Six Day War which aroused
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dormant Jews throughout the world to a new sense of their independence” (Singer,
1971, p 82). Relating this to lobby literature, the American Jewry’s newly-found
identity shows that they were beginning to realize their “organized interest” (Lowery,
2007, p 29). They had created what Cumberlege refers to as “an aligned community”
(Cumberlege, 2004, p 20).
Therefore, the chapter discussing the Holocaust underscored the non-existence
of a concrete Israel Lobby during the time period even though there were few
American Jewish organizations that attempted to help the European Jewry. Next, we
looked at 1948 whereby there were several American Zionists and American Zionist
organizations pushing aggressively for the cause of Israel, specifically the Zionist
Organization of American (ZOA), revealing that there was significant activity for the
cause. “With the founding of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, the ZOA's role
diminished and shifted to fund raising and public relations on behalf of Israel”
(“Zionist Organization of America,” 2013, para 2). Following 1948, we looked at the
1956 war in which the Israel Lobby was barely active. In reference to the previous
information about the fall of the ZOA after 1948, in the year directly after the 1956
war, a large number of influential American Zionists broke away, leaving the ZOA
and establishing their own entity (“Zionist Organization of America,” 2013, para 2).
Following 1956, by observing the 1967 war we see that there was also very minimal
activity. It can be concluded that in 1948, there was obviously no adequate
institutional basis or foundation because after Israel had been established, their role
was diminished seeing as how in the following conflicts they were barely active.
However, specifically after the 1967 war had taken place, the American Jewry had
started mobilizing, and attained a voice. We see the American Jewry slowly gaining
their voice in the American political scene, and the Israel Lobby plays a part in this.
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The aim of the following section is to discuss this continued evolution of the Israel
Lobby by observing the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

Chapter 9: The Change Becomes Evident
The aim of this chapter is to show that by the 1973 war, the Israel Lobby’s
attitude had differed completely from the other previous two conflicts in 1956 and
1967; the lobby had become more organized and by this specific time period it was
now strong since it had both influence as well as “agency” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 779). The most compelling example is evident though Kissinger’s incident of
sending weapons to Israel during the 1973 war. The chapter will also underscore that
the decade of the 1970s was a very critical time period for the lobby for three main
reasons: the lobby saw increased reward, functional changes, and more cooperation
between the different organizations. The 1970s represents a time period in which the
Israel Lobby saw increased organizational strength, flourished, and built on the post1967 period, and focused on Israel and US-Israel relations.
The case of the 1973 war is very interesting. From the primary sources, we are
able to point out that the U.S. had strayed from Israel, in terms of weapons; Walt and
Mearsheimer mention the fact that the U.S. “responded slowly to Israel’s initial
requests for help” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 43). One possible reason for this
stance was because Israel always presented itself as more powerful than the Arabs; for
example, when discussing the 1973 war “Major General Ariel Sharon recalled: ‘These
were soldiers who had been brought up on victories….It was a generation that had
never lost. Now they were in a state of shock….How was it that [the Egyptians] were
moving forward and we were defeated?’ (Browne, 2015, para 32). The fact that the
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Arabs were fighting in this method shocked the Israelis, and they felt that they were
under major threat. However, there is a major recalculation in the American attitude,
specifically after the Israeli Ambassador meets with Henry Kissinger. America’s
stance had changed “when Israel encountered unexpected difficulties and began
running short of critical military supplies” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 43). The
result was what the official governmental documents have relayed, and will be
discussed further below.

A.

The Change

“The heightened concern with Israel’s well-being within Jewish
organizations continued during the War of Attrition (1969-1970) and
the October War (1973)…these conflicts also raised fears about
Israel’s security, thereby reinforcing the Israelcentric focus of many
Jewish community-relations groups” (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p
118-119).
Thus, this evolution, as well as connection, is described
“by Albert Chernin, the longtime executive of NJCRAC [National
Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council], who declared in 1978
that, in the field of communal relations, ‘[o]ur first priority is Israel, of
course, reflecting the complete identity of views of the American Jewish
leadership with the concerns of the rank and file of the American
Jewish community’ – a stunning admission that political efforts to shore
up Israel superseded all other concerns of Jewish community relations
organizations in the United States” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 32-33).
Therefore, what can be understood from these quotes is that the strong
connection that the American Jews had felt with Israel after the 1967 war became
even stronger in 1973, and Israel had become an issue of primacy for them. The
American Jews also became very united. There are three different ways in which the
Israel Lobby evolved in the 1970s, and they will be discussed further below. Two of
these changes will be centered specifically on AIPAC.
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According to Wertheimer, the American Jewish community is currently able to
gather massive “funds” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 54) as well as have “political
mechanisms to lobby in behalf of Israel” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 54). This feeling of
necessity to lobby occurred “first…after the 1973 Yom Kippur War as a result of a
development that significantly reshaped relations between Israeli and American Jews:
U.S. government financial aid to Israel increased astronomically” (Wertheimer, 1995,
p 54). Wertheimer underscores that aid went from “between $25 and $50 million to
approximately $2 billion annually as part of the disengagement treaties arranged by
Henry Kissinger in the wake of the Yom Kippur War” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 54).
Therefore, the donations by American Jews to Israel, very briefly mentioned in the
previous chapter, were regarded as extremely minimal in contrast to what the
American government was paying (Wertheimer, 1995, p 54). “The greatest
contribution American Jewry could make to Israel was to ensure that high levels of
U.S. aid continued” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 54), and this happened through “lobbying”
(Wertheimer, 1995, p 54). Wertheimer provides examples of how exactly Jewish
organizations attempted to succeed at lobbying for this cause:
“In the 1970s, then, sectors of the organized community that previously
had paid scant attention to Israel-related matters now threw their
energies and resources into such lobbying. The Council of Jewish
Federations formed an Israel Task Force, and the community relations
field shifted much of its personnel and budget to the task of explaining
Israel’s needs to the American public. In the early 1970s, for example,
NJCRAC [National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council]
estimated that 65 percent of its budget was spent on activities for Israel
and Soviet Jewry. The American Jewish Committee spent between 25
and 50 percent of its budgets on Israel-related programs, while the
ADL [Anti-Defamation League] allocated 30 percent to Israel
programming, and the American Jewish Congress, though less involved
with Israel then, assigned it 14 percent of its budget” (Wertheimer,
1995, p 54-55).
Therefore, Wertheimer’s previous quote demonstrates that these American
Jewish organizations, two of which are currently members of the Israel Lobby (Weir,
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2014), found it necessary to create new branches that target just the issue of Israel,
and in doing so they were better preparing themselves, distributing tasks, and
becoming more organized. These characteristics were very lacking in all of the
previously discussed sections. In direct relevance to this point, the table below
presents the idea that during this time period, the Israel Lobby was in the forefront.
“Rank Order Listing of Most Active Interest Groups, 1966 – 1974” (Trice, 1976, p
38)
Ran
k

Name

1

Action
Committee
on Arab
American
Relations

Opinion
Group
Classificatio
n
Pro-Arab

Total
N
Even
ts
82

%
Total
Activi
ty
6.6%

Date
Founded

Still in
Existence?

If ceased to
exist,
when?

1962

In late
1980s
renamed:
AmericanArab
Relations
Committee

No
available
information

(Curtiss,
1998, para 6)

(Curtiss,
1998, para
6)
2

3

4

AntiDefamatio
n League
of B’nai
B’rith
Conference
of
Presidents
of Major
American
Jewish
Organizati
ons
American
Jewish
Committee

Pro- Israel

60

4.9

1913
(“About,”
2016)

Yes

Pro- Israel

60

4.9

1951

Yes

(“Encyclopedi
a
Judaica,”
2008, para 1)

Pro-Israel

59

4.8

1906
(American
Jewish
Committee,
n.d., para 1)

Yes
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5

6

7

8
9

10
11

12

13

14
14

American
Jewish
Congress

Pro-Israel

Zionist
Organizati
on of
America
Jewish
Defense
League

Pro-Israel

53

4.3

Pro-Israel

46

3.7

National
Council of
Churches
B’nai
B’rith

Christian/Neu
tral

25

2.0

Pro-Israel

22

1.8

Rabbi
Board (of
New York)
Associatio
n of
AmericanArab
University
Graduates
A.F.L.C.I.O

Pro-Israel

18

1.5

Pro-Arab

17

1.4

American
Israel
Public
Affairs
Committee
American
Council for
Judaism
Synagogue
Council of
American

58

4.7

1918

Yes

(“American
Jewish
Congress,”
para 1, 2016)
1897
(“What is the
ZOA?”, 2016,
para 1)
1968
(“Background
er,” 2013,
para 1)
1950
(“About,”n.d.,
para 1)
1843
(“About Us,”
2016, para 2)

Yes

1881
(“Guide,”
2011, para 1)
1967

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

No

(“Summary,”
n.d.)
Labor

Pro-Israel

16

51

2007
(“Summary,
” n.d.)

1.3

1955

Yes

1.2

(“American
Federation,”
2014, para 8)
1959

Yes

(Schoolman,
1997)
Anti-Zionist

14

1.1

Pro-Israel

14

1.1

1942
(“About Us,”
2010, para 1)
1926
(“Synagogue
Council of
America,”
2008, para 1)

Yes
No

1994
(“Synagogu
e Council of
America,”
2008, para
4)
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14

17

17

United
Jewish
Appeal

Pro-Israel

Rabbinical
Council of
America

Pro-Israel

National
Black
Political
Conventio
n

Black

14

1.1

1939
(“United
Jewish
Communities,
” 2008, para
17)

13

13

1.1

1935

1.1

(“About Us
[RCA],”
2016, para 1)
1972

Now The
1999
United
Jewish
(“United
Communitie
Jewish
s
Communitie
(“United
s,” 2008,
Jewish
para 1)
Communitie
s,” 2008,
para 1)
Yes

No

(“Milestones,”
2006, para 1)

Tota
ls

609

49.2%

** This table has been copied from (Trice, 1976, 38), with the exception of the
last three columns.
Therefore, this table is significant because it underscores the findings in
chapter four, with regard to the 1967 war, as well as chapter five, concerning the 1973
war and the lobby’s consecutive strength. The table shows that out of the 17 “most
active interest groups” (Trice, 1976, 38) between the specified years of “1966 –
1974” (Trice, 1976, 38), 12 of them are labeled as “pro-Israel” (Trice, 1976, 38),
which means approximately 71 percent of these organizations. To add to that, of these
12 organizations (Trice, 1976, p 37), five of them are currently official members of
the Israel Lobby today: Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, American Jewish Committee,
Zionist Organization of America, and American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(Weir, 2014).
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Wertheimer further emphasizes that there were two organizations leading the
“lobbying [process] for Israel” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 55): the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations as well as AIPAC (Wertheimer,
1995, p 55). These two organizations are part of the Israel Lobby (Weir, 2014), and
Wertheimer notes that they had a very limited role in the past, which is a point that
coincides with the previous chapter (Wertheimer, 1995, p 55). Their rise in power
took place “in the 1970s and 1980s” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 55); The Conference of
Presidents and AIPAC worked together and divided tasks (Wertheimer, 1995, p 55)
whereby “The Conference of Presidents took responsibility for speaking to the
executive branch of the American government on matters pertaining to Israel, and
AIPAC dealt mainly with the legislative branch” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 55),
underscoring that it is after these re-organizational changes and cooperation initiatives
in the “1970s and 1980s” (Wertheimer, 1995, p 55).that AIPAC’s focus centered on
Congress. Therefore, the change is now obvious as we begin to see a very clear
starting point with regard to organization, mobility, cooperation, and power.
In a document issued by AIPAC in 2008, the organization openly states the
role it played to assist Israel during the war in 1973:

(AIPAC, 2008, p 3)
It is Isaiah Kenen who, as the head of AIPAC at the time, played a defining
role in this case. He explains that at the very beginning of the war, he worked with
“30 Washington Jewish leaders” (Kenen, 1981, p 300) to work on a resolution that
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would “urge Congress to adopt a resolution promising Israel support in negotiation
for peace. We drafted the text along with a telegram urging senators to vote for it”
(Kenen, 1981, p 300). On the next day, Kenen took it upon himself to visit the
Republican “Senate leader [Scott]” ”(Kenen, 1981, p 300) and took his “draft”
(Kenen, 1981, p 300) to him. He explains that his “draft was side-tracked, and neither
Scott nor Kissinger could tell me who was responsible when I questioned them later”
(Kenen, 1981, p 300). Kenen goes on to say that “although the Senate did not
consider my draft resolution, many members expressed support for Israel” (Kenen,
1981, p 301). Through Kenen’s telling of the events, he provides one significant detail
that shows that the Israel Lobby had power during the war:
“CBS interviewer…jolted Fulbright: ‘It is a fairly serious charge to say
that your colleagues in the Senate- some 70 of them are controlled by a
power group rather than by their own vision of what they think are
proper principles of freedom and right.’ Fulbright retreated just a little:
‘They have been persuaded that this is in our interest. I don’t know
these niceties of semantics, perhaps I could withdraw it and rephrase it.
It still comes out with the fact that influence is dominant.’ ” (Kenen,
1981, p 301).
Kenen explains that when the United States was starting to send weapons to
Israel, “Israel’s friends circulated the congressional resolutions which had been held
back…they served a significant purpose – to encourage the Administration to
continue to strengthen Israel, and, in effect, to ask for the $2.2 billion arms
authorization which Nixon proposed on October 14” (Kenen, 1981, p 305). Thus, he
is speaking of the resolution he had taken to Scott at the very beginning of the war; it
was now moving forward and being put to use. Kenen states:
“Our office began calling constituents to encourage their congressmen
to co-sponsor, and when the resolutions were introduced (on October
18 in the Senate, and October 23 in the House), the sponsors included
68 senators and 260 representatives. Others added their names,
bringing the total to 71 senators and 269 representatives” ”(Kenen,
1981, p 305).
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Thus, from Kenen’s chapter, it can be understood that there were two choices to be
made: primarily the U.S. could send weapons to Israel and proceed with the $2 billion
to Israel, or it could choose to abstain from undergoing these actions.

B.

The Outcome

Kenen’s description of events is in line with what AIPAC says it had
accomplished 35 years earlier. Kenen went even further when he states that he had
“testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations to
describe the disastrous effects of the war and worldwide inflation of Israel” (Kenen,
1981, p 307). He explains that he was not just the voice of AIPAC, but the voice of
“all the organizations in the Presidents Conference” (Kenen, 1981, p 307), the
organization which has been mentioned numerous times. This signifies unity between
these organizations, and underscores that they were working for this one cause
together. This resolution did go through since Rubenberg states that “on October 19
the American Congress passed emergency legislation providing Israel $2.2 billion to
pay for the new weapons. This financial aid was indeed a watershed in U.S. support
for Israel, both quantitatively and qualitatively” (Rubenberg, 1986, p 164). Hence,
AIPAC did play an important role during the 1973 war, and their position signifies a
very weighted one in American politics.
Official White House documents have been published recently and they
present forth the conversations that took place between the key political figures such
as the Jordanian King, Anwar El Sadat, Henry Kissinger, and the Israeli Ambassador
in the U.S. throughout the span of the war. There are specific conversations that need
to be highlighted because they are very telling with regard to the Israel Lobby and its
power.
In the late hours of October 12th and the early hours of October 13th, Henry
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Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz had a very intense conversation.
What can be understood from the conversation is that the United States was simply
not supporting Israel enough throughout the war, and it was not fulfilling its promises
(Howland and Daigle, 2011, p 459 - 460). The U.S. was supposed to send warplanes
to Israel in order to aid with the fight; however, this plan was not materializing, even
to Kissinger’s surprise who repeatedly claimed they were “authorized” (Howland and
Daigle, 2011, p 461) to do so. The more critical part of the conversation occurs in the
following section:
“Dinitz: The Prime Minister asked me to tell you we have based our
operations on this basis, and as well as what we . . .
Kissinger: Can I tell this to Schlesinger now?
[Picks up phone]: Get me Schlesinger.
Dinitz: Yes.
To save a little of the situation—I’m not talking about an initiative, but
about saving the situation—the planes must fly directly to Israel.
Kissinger: There will be a mutiny here. That’s impossible.
Dinitz: So help me, I must tell you, there will be a mutiny here if there
are no planes. The Jewish community, and many friends, and the labor
movement and the press. I’ve been making no comment. I can’t do it. I
have no right, no historical right; we are dealing with the destiny of
people” (Howland and Daigle, 2011, p 461).
The last two underlined statements by Kissinger and Dinitz are the most important
parts of the conversation because they show how much Kissinger took the Israel
Lobby and Jewish community into account; Kissinger, previously, was obviously
not rushing to help Israel. However, once he was threatened, he actually worried
about the way in which the lobby would react to the American government being
unable to aid Israel enough during the war, and the example of the role AIPAC was
playing at the same time as the conversation was taking place represents that
Kenen, as well as AIPAC, had accessibility and a voice that was heard within the
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Congress. This is made even more obvious when Kissinger reacts by calling
Schlesinger, the secretary of defense at the time:
“Kissinger: [talks to Schlesinger on phone] Hello Jim.
[Schlesinger: Hi Henry.]
Kissinger: I’ve just been meeting on an urgent basis with Dinitz, who
says they are running out substantially of ammunition. They based their
strategy on the assumption that they would get the ammunition replaced
this week, as the President had promised them on Tuesday, and that
they are stopping their offensive in Syria because they can’t move
because of lack of supplies. And the Egyptians have transferred
artillery over and now they are saying there is a problem of a major
thrust into the Sinai. And it is true we gave them our assurances.
[Schlesinger: Well, what do you want to do?]
Kissinger: Well, I don’t know what I want to do. I just feel that we did
make some undertaking—you know it would help us. I was raising hell
with them for not keeping their offensive going for a day while we were
setting up the scenario on diplomacy. And now they have got to stop it.”
(Howland and Daigle, 2011, p 461- 462).
After Kissinger had a long conversation with Schlesinger, the conclusion was
as follows: “Kissinger: [hangs up, turns to Dinitz]: They’ll give you ten C–130’s
immediately, and will load them with ammunition. And probably fly them with
American pilots” (Howland and Daigle, 2011, p 461- 464). This quote is extremely
significant because it shows what Kissinger did out of fear of the lobby; he responded
immediately to the Israeli ambassador’s request. The second very important
conversation that took place, which also involves the Israel Lobby, occurred two days
later while the war was still taking place:
“Mr. Clements: Is anyone thinking about quote foreign military sales
unquote? What are we going to do about this volume.
Mr. Rush: We have a serious problem.
Mr. Clements: We will need a supplemental.
Secretary Kissinger: Let’s get the Jewish lobby to get us the money.
And let’s wrap some other things in it too. Go see (Senator) Ribicoff.
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Mr. Sisco: Let’s get a Congressional package and get it moving in the
next 24 hours.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and don’t be modest. They have been
screaming for it—let (Senator) Jackson put it through. And get
Cambodia taken care of in the package. It’s an absurdity that we have
to lose our war. If we had put one F–4 into Cambodia they would have
screamed bloody murder.
Mr. Sisco: (to Clements) Curtis Tarr and Sy Weiss will work with you
on this.
Secretary Kissinger: Let’s get it today” (Howland and Daigle, 2011, p
534).
Therefore, this segment of the conversation is critical because it indicates that
it was the Israel Lobby, which they refer to as the “Jewish Lobby” (Howland and
Daigle, 2011, p 534) obviously had influence with the Congress. So, Kissinger was
using them because he wanted to get votes for this “money” (Howland and Daigle,
2011, p 534) he mentions, and he finds that the only way to do so was through the
lobby. This shows that Kissinger actually needed them to go to Congress, and this
underscores that the Israel Lobby had the ability to act, as well as had the “access”
(Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803) in Congress. This point is also significant because it
can be directly contrasted with 1956 whereby the American Jews were used as a tool
to get to Israel, now they were being used to get to Congress. This demonstrates more
internal influence.
1.

Lobbying Techniques and Influence

According to Hojnacki and Kimball, lobbies “can work directly to build
coalitions in Congress in addition to relying on legislative friends” (Hojnacki and
Kimball, 1998, p 775). Goldberg emphasizes that AIPAC followed this exact same
method, and that is why it was able to “achieve its goals during the war” (Goldberg,
1990, p 48).
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“For interest groups to affect policy, they must not only gain access to
governmental actors who are sympathetic to their policy preferences,
but they must get support from governmental actors who can,
themselves, make a meaningful input into the decision that finally
emerges” (Trice, 1976, p 55).
This quote by Trice is in direct alignment with the varying lobbying theories
discussed by Hojnacki and Kimball, as they explain that interest groups pick exactly
who they lobby, they claim that “a group will target committee members based on the
likelihood of those legislators acting on the group’s behalf in committee as well as
later in the legislative process” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 778). Therefore, with
regard to this aspect of lobbying, AIPAC underwent an ingenious endeavor after the
1973 war by actually choosing to inform the new “young congressmen
and….senators” (Tivnan, 1987, 83) who were not aware of the issue. By doing so,
AIPAC was molding these insiders for its cause, and ensuring, as Hojnacki and
Kimball have explained, that they would vote for its cause. In addition to this, this
supports Hojnacki and Kimball’s point that AIPAC was widening its reach (Hojnacki
and Kimball, 1998, p 778) by targeting fresh members of Congress and attempting to
convince these individuals “to support the group’s interests” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 778). By doing so, they were establishing the “connections” (Cumberlege,
2004, p.30) that Cumberlege underscored.
Trice continues explaining that the Israel Lobby specifically between the years
of “1966 – 1974” (Trice, 1976, p 58) chose to lobby people who were already siding
with Israel and were “predisposed to support their policy positions” (Trice, 1976, p
58). Trice emphasizes that the Israel Lobby tended to focus on Congress rather than
the State Department as “they believed that support was much easier to extract from
Congress, even though on most diplomatic issues Congress was not a primary
governmental actor” (Trice, 1976, p 58). When cases did occur and they had to lobby
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the State Department, they tended to divert their attention to people who were
recognized for sympathizing with Israel (Trice, 1976, p 58). This lobbying technique
is very much in alignment with Hojnacki and Kimball as they discuss the essentiality
of having “legislative allies” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 778) because they will
be the ones who drive forward “favorable amendments and repel unfavorable
amendments in committee to strengthen the content of a bill” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 778). In addition to this, they may also be able to convince other congressmen
to support their cause and result in the creation of a “proposal that emerges from
committee [that] has the best chance of survival on the floor” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 778).
In addition to this, it is necessary to discuss the subject of money. According
to Hojnacki and Kimball, money plays a defining role in lobbying: “organizations
with fewer resources will be more likely to concentrate solely on their allies in
committee” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 779), while those who do have a large
monetary capacity and “a comparative advantage in resources” (Hojnacki and
Kimball, 1998, p 779) will go one step further by lobbying individuals that do not
necessarily agree with their cause, as well as others who have not yet formulated an
opinion on the matter (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 779). This issue of “resources”
(Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 779) can be directly connected to the previously
relayed conversation between Kissinger, Clements, and Sisco whereby Kissinger
openly suggests that they turn to the Israel Lobby for monetary help in order to push
forward a “package” (Howland and Daigle, 2011, p 534) for Israel; therefore, they
turned to the Israel Lobby for its comparative advantage in resources” (Hojnacki and
Kimball, 1998, p 779) since it had the ability to reach within Congress and get the
money from them. With regard to lobbying techniques, this newly revealed moment

Bahnassy,107	
  
in history is essential for several critical reasons. Primarily, it does not only present
forward the previously mentioned fact that the Israel Lobby had accessibility with the
Congress, it also supports Isaacs’ point that as the war took place, the Israel Lobby
was able to gather an extremely large sum of money. Isaacs characterizes this moment
in history as:
“the most spectacular Jewish giving of all came during and after the
Yom Kippur War of 1973, when more than $100 million was raised for
Israel in several days. The war pushed the 1974 fund-raising goals to
the vicinity of one billion dollars” (Isaacs, 1974, 119).
To add to that, this money feeds into the idea of “agency” (Hojnacki and
Kimball, 1998, p 779) put forward by Hall and Wayman’s survey of varying lobbying
theories. They explain that money works in a cycle because it leads to “access” (Hall
and Wayman, 1990, p 803) which in return leads to “agency” (Hall and Wayman,
1990, p 803). Thus, by going to Congress and taking this large sum of money to the
White House, the Israel Lobby must have been able to gain “access” (Hall and
Wayman, 1990, p 803) as well as “agency” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803). These
factors can also be linked to the previously mentioned conversation between
Kissinger and the Israeli ambassador; Goldberg emphasizes that AIPAC was
distressed due to the issue of the “delaying of the airlift” (Goldberg, 50, 1990).
Therefore, now that these private conversations have been revealed, it is clear why the
Israeli ambassador had threatened unrest of the Israel Lobby if these planes did not go
through to Israel; the lobby had “agency” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803) to act. In
addition to this, Goldberg cites the “$2.2 billion” (Goldberg, 1990, p 49) of aid money
provided to Israel by the US during the war, and underscores that this money had
been “swift[ly]” (Goldberg, 1990, p 49) approved, denoting AIPAC’s “access” (Hall
and Wayman, 1990, p 803) and “agency” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803) because
he emphasizes that they were the ones who “focused…attention” (Goldberg, 1990, p
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49) on this specific cause, a point that has been underscored through Kenan’s retelling
of the events .
2.

Post- 1973

AIPAC continued to evolve after 1973 when it dramatically shifted its
methodology. Isaiah Kenen was still the person in charge during the war in 1973.
According to Edward Tivnan, “after Vietnam and Watergate, the House and Senate
began to change; there were younger and more activist politicians… Kenen’s pals
were either retiring or dying. No longer would a few strong arms be able to keep
everyone in the pro-Israel line” (Tivnan, 1987, p 83). At the same time, AIPAC
believed that the most significant entity was “Congress-AIPAC’s traditional turf”
(Tivnan, 1987, p 83). Therefore, the issue no longer relied on connections, and
AIPAC needed to adapt to this “change” (Tivnan, 1987, p 83) because it felt that it
was no longer connected to the people within this entity that they believed was so
critical. By 1975, Morris Amitay took Kenen’s place (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p
119). What Amitay did differently from Kenen was magnify AIPAC’s reach (Tivnan,
1987, p 83). He aimed “to extend its network and concentrate on influencing – and
educating – scores of young congressmen and an increasing number of senators
ignorant of Middle East history and diplomacy” (Tivnan, 1987, p 83). Thus, he did
not just depend on existent connections, as Kenen had done, but he took it upon
AIPAC to establish new allies within the entity they saw to be most significant.
According to Hojnacki and Kimball, “only those organizations with strong resource
base…will have the capacity to move beyond their allies and lobby…undecided
legislators” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p 779); they also underscore that such
“groups with a comparative advantage in resources” (Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998, p
779) do so. Thus, it is clear that the lobby had such means and capabilities from the
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amount of money donated in 1967.
Therefore, with regard to this point, we can see a significant shift between
1948 and, specifically 1975, whereby in 1948 the Zionists had targeted the executive;
however, by 1975 Amitay aimed at targeting the legislative branch, Congress, in order
to have them in line with his organization’s interests. In 2004, “CNN report[ed] that
AIPAC… holds 2000 meetings a year with US Senators and Congressmen, leading to
the passage of an average of 100 pro-Israel pieces of legislation every year” (Cole,
2004, para 5), which underscores that the organization had continued in this path
almost 30 years later. If this method had not been effective, it would have changed its
route.
Therefore, as mentioned earlier the Israel Lobby underwent three significant
changes; one has already been mentioned with regard to the functional changes that
took place within the entities. The two other changes are directly related to AIPAC.
The first major change in AIPAC had to do with the leaders’ attitudes. Kenen and
Amitay were polar opposites, and therefore led AIPAC in two different directions.
Kenen was viewed as “diplomatic and chummy” (Tivnan, 1987, 83) with those in
Congress. Amitay, on the other hand, was characterized as “aggressive” (Tivnan,
1987, p 83), and according to Tivnan, “Capitol Hill did not appreciate the head of a
lobby threatening to shut off Jewish campaign funds if they didn’t vote AIPAC’s
way” (Tivnan, 1987, p 83). Therefore, Amitay made AIPAC project “its power”
(Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007, p 119) “instead of shunning the limelight” (Walt and
Mearsheimer, 2007, p 119), as Kenen had proceeded to do in the past. Tom Dine,
who later took Amitay’s place, also followed Amitay’s footsteps, and these two men
were able to “transform [AIPAC] from an intimate, low-budget operation into an
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annual budget (derived solely from private contributions that went from some
$300,000 in 1973 to an estimated $40-60 million today” (Walt and Mearsheimer,
2007, p 119).
The second major change that took place in AIPAC, as well as other members
of the Israel Lobby, was a shift in their mentality; they attempted to achieve their
goals by shifting the way in which they framed their interests, and this can be seen
very clearly through the following quote:
“AIPAC and other groups in the lobby did not define their public
agenda as humanitarian support for Jews in Israel. Rather, the
evolution of the lobby increasingly involved the formulation and
promotion of sophisticated arguments about the alignment of America’s
and Israel’s strategic interests and moral values” (Walt and
Mearsheimer, 2007, p 119).
This quote signifies that the Israel Lobby found that if it could link AmericanIsraeli interests directly together, it could get U.S. support for Israel, which is also a
tactic that we begin to see is mentioned for the first time.
In conclusion, through the examination of the 1973 war, we are able to see the
Israel Lobby’s mobility, and the different organizations working together for the sake
of Israel. In addition to this, the lobby was able to revolutionize its functional duties,
interests, and specifically with the case of AIPAC, its entire attitude. These innovative
changes enabled the lobby to gain influence in the American political scene.

Conclusion and Recommendations
In one article, the Israel Lobby was listed as number nine out of the “10
biggest lobbies in Washington” (Hastley, 2011, para 18). What is crucial about this
point is that it is the only lobby on the list that attempts to change American “foreign
policy” (Hastley, 2011, para 18), which underscores that the Israel lobby is in fact the
strongest lobby within this category.

Bahnassy,111	
  
To conclude this project, I initially started with the 2003 war in Iraq because it
shows that by this specific time period, the Israel Lobby had become extremely
powerful, and this serves to contrast their non-existence during the Holocaust time
period, as well as the fact that it took them years of hard work to be in the position
that they were in then. I then explored the Holocaust time period which revealed the
anti-Semitism that caused American Jews to hide their identities. The chapter also
presents the different American Jewish organizations that attempted to help European
Jewry, but these attempts were usually linked to the issue of Palestine. By 1948,
American Zionists were rallying for the cause of a Jewish state; in this cause, they
were united. However, after the goal had been achieved, their momentum had
decreased because there was no “Israel Lobby” as an actual functioning entity, it
appeared to have been merely a proto-lobby. Next, the 1956 war chapter revealed that
the Israel Lobby did not have enough influence to get the American president to
change his stance with regard to Israel, and in this case, he forced Israel to do what he
wanted and not what it preferred. By the 1967 war, the chapter reveals that the Israel
Lobby also did not play a major role during this event either because the general
atmosphere was pro-Israel; even the American president himself appeared to be in
support of the state. It is only after the 1967 war that we see a major change in the
American Jewish community whereby they begin to gain their voice. This activeness
is strengthened in the 1970s, and specifically after the Yom Kippur War as the Israel
Lobby begins to develop functional changes and cooperate within itself. The fact that
Kissinger used the Israel Lobby to get money from Congress during the Yom Kippur
war reveals their influence, as well as how far they had come along since the
Holocaust time period. After the war, the new leader of AIPAC brought with him a
different attitude, a far more aggressive one that Kenen’s.
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Therefore, this significance of this thesis is that it provides a historical
perspective to the Israel Lobby, and discusses the subject from a completely different
lens than is usually used to observe the lobby. This ties back to the previously
mentioned quote in the introduction, in which AIPAC was characterized as a
“magnificent creation” (Freilich, 2015), and how this “creation” (Freilich, 2015) came
to be. As the literature review chapter has underscored, the discourse tends to ignore
the importance of this historical perspective. This project also presents that the Israel
Lobby, even though it has been able to gain influence in American politics, did not
always achieve its goals. This is especially true in the case of 1956. As for the Iran
Nuclear Deal mentioned in the introduction, the outcome depends on perception. It
had fought for the review, and attained it, but the deal still went through. Therefore, it
can be concluded that it achieved its short-term goal, and not its long-term one.
Therefore, this leads to the idea that the Israel Lobby’s strength may be exaggerated
or presented as extreme. Lara Friedman sides with this view when she stated that
“For people who want to say there is a hidden hand, or maybe not so
hidden, behind U.S. Middle East policy and it is the Israel Lobby, I
think that that does not hold up. It does not hold up to even fairly
superficial analysis. For people who want to say how dare you
suggest that there is an Israel Lobby that plays a role, that is antiSemitic, I think that doesn’t hold up either. There are clearly
organizations, including my own and many that are more powerful
than mine, who work very hard, who have very very good access
within various government circles- you’re talking Congress or given
administration- and within a democracy that’s what they’re supposed
to do….this is part of a healthy democracy” (L. Friedman, personal
communication, March 14, 2016).
This project is significant because, through the study of the lobby’s evolution,
we are able to counter the ideas that the lobby constantly has an impact on U.S.
foreign policy, as well as tie back to Barari’s idea that Arabs have incorrect
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assumptions and “ideas” (Barari, 2009, p 4). Therefore, this project is the first step in
correcting them.

A.

Recommendations

This evolution of the Israel Lobby is essential to explore because it enables
other lobbies to learn for its experience. In this specific case, it is the Arab Lobby that
I am concerned with. “Given its weakness when compared to its pro-Israel
counterpart, the pro-Arab Lobby has had a spotty history in the United States. Its very
existence is often contested even from within its own ranks” (Marrar, 2009, p 84).
The fact that people doubt its presence underscores the weakness and lack of visibility
in the picture. Therefore, the Arab Lobby, according to Marrar’s description, appears
to be in its early stages and can be resembled to the Zionist Lobby, or proto-lobby,
described in the 1948 chapter.
“Former President of the NAAA [National Association of ArabAmericans] Joseph Baroody once remarked, we can’t represent the
Arabs the way the Jewish Lobby can represent Israel. The Israeli
government has one policy to state, whereas we couldn’t represent the
‘the Arabs’ if we wanted to. They’re as different as the Libyans and
Saudis are different, or as divided as the Christian and Moslem
Lebanese” (Marrar, 2009, p 88).
The significance of this quote is that it exemplifies the Arab problem (Marrar,
2009, p 88). Therefore, one recommendation in this case that we have learned from
the Israel lobby, and should be applied by the Arab lobby, is cooperation; just as the
organizations within the Israel lobby began cooperating together in the 1970s, the
organizations within the Arab Lobby should find it in their best interest to do so as
well; this will strengthen their cause. According to Blankfort, the Israel Lobby’s
opposition is extremely weak; “the Arab-American organizations in Washington, the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) and the Arab-American
Institute (AAI), being both too small and too timid to challenge even their shadow”
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(Blankfort, 2006, para 24). This is another reason why cooperation is key. If there is
no strong opposition to the Israel lobby from the Arab lobby, then the Israel lobby
will continue to be the only voice that is heard. However, if the Arab lobby cooperates
together to strengthen and unify its voice, this will show the American government
that there are other voices that also need to be heard. Thus, it is necessary for them to
find mutual interests that they should work together to promote.
	
  
There appears to be another problem with the Arab Lobby, one of money.
“From 1990 until 2002, pro-Israel political action committees (PACs) gave a total of
$48,985,897 to political candidates compared to only $296,830 contributed by all
Arab and Muslim pressure groups combined” (Marrar, 2009, p 88). Therefore, the
first recommendation of working together is directly linked to being able to gather
such massive funds. It is only when they have such “resources” (Hojnacki and
Kimball, 1998, p 776) will they be able to have “access” (Hojnacki and Kimball,
1998, p 776) and “agency” (Hall and Wayman, 1990, p 803), and this has been an
obvious lesson learned from observing the Israel lobby’s evolution. This has been
exemplified through the example of 1973 in which Kissinger made the Israel Lobby
get money from Congress, underscoring their access.
	
  
Finally Marrar highlights an essential point of change that the Arab Lobby has
undergone and needs to continue to follow: support the two-state solution (Marrar,
2009, p 110). What Marrar is advising here is directly relevant to what we learned in
the 1973 chapter whereby, after the war, the Israel Lobby learned to align its interest
to the US government’s interests in order to achieve its goals. Therefore, the last
recommendation is for the Arab Lobby to do so as well.
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